[CrackMonkey] Lindsey Graham

[Mike Goldman]

Seth David Schoen wrote:

> > Consent for the PROCESS, certainly.  Look, nobody is FORCING people to vote.  So
> > if you do it, you have willingly accepted the rules.  It's like, when someone
> > offers you a deal, and you accept the benefits, you acquire the obligation.
>
> That sounds like social contract theory. :-)

No.  Straightforward contract.  Social contract theory supposes that you can be
COMPELLED to accept a contract merely by EXISTING within a social structure that you
had the (good or bad) fortune to be born into.  I don't hold with this, but where
there is no express or implied force which compels acceptance of a benefit, then your
acceptance does give consent.  There are mitigating considerations, relating to
constructive fraud and such, which may vitiate the contract even after the fact, but
one cannot knowingly and willingly then CONTINUE to benefit.

> The only problem with that theory as a description of actual political life
> in democracies is that the actual opportunity to refuse to consent is not
> given (let alone taken as a default).

Which is what I said, except you said it more concisely.

However, I don't think anyone would argue that one is compelled to accept EVERY
benefit, and moreover, the exercise of certain franchises are fundamental to
acceptance of the whole thing, whereas others have a distinctly more limited
implication.  Voting, it seems to me, is the ultimate acceptance of responsibility for
the administration of the state.

> So, we end up with "casuistical politics", as Robert Wolff put it in his
> _In Defense of Anarchism_: there _shouldn't_ have been a state, and the
> state is wrong, but some people went and created it anyway, for some
> reason.  There is now an ethical question of how to behave toward it.

As an example: the state has assumed plenary control of the roads and highways, such
that one cannot travel without using the "privilege" of its pavement, maintenance,
etc.  Since traveling is comprehended in the fundamental definition of personal
liberty (see, e.g. Blackstone), such "acceptance" must be deemed involuntary and
therefore non-binding upon the (moral/ethical) obligations of the individual.

> Many people try to say that, because of their willingness to accept the
> benefits the state offers, citizens (sic) acquire obligations toward it.

Again, the key word here is "willingness" and not the mere acceptance thereof.

> The casuistical point is that, given that a state exists, you have to
> decide how to behave toward it, which might involve some attempts to
> change its behavior in particular instances, recognizing that it can't
> be abolished immediately.

Agreed.  But to say simply that, "you have to decide," suggests that the outcome of
such decisionmaking is value-free, a matter of personal taste or opinion only.  I
don't think that this is true.  Certainly it is impossible to expect perfect alignment
of one's stance with principles, but some approximations are better than others.
Becoming a "principal" of the state by voting in its elections seems to me a
declaration that one is personally PART OF the state, interested in its continuance
and future direction.

> Usually people who are worrying about whether voting is right or wrong tend
> to be the most interested in what voting means.  (Political scientists
> might be a close second.)

As far as the "worrying" component goes, you are absolutely right, but I think that a
great many people instinctively feel alienated from the state, and do not vote for the
same reasons as us, just with less self-analysis.  Many of them feel embarassed about
their stance because they cannot logically justify it, but that doesn't mean they are
wrong.

> Sure.  "Voting" here only refers to state elections, although there is a
> general cultural perception that majority rule is a fair or appropriate
> solution in most situations of conflict or disagreement.

There are implementation issues with a properly consensus-based system, but it is
unquestionably the most fair if these can be resolved.

> Another way to talk about this would be to say that certain complaints are
> inappropriate because they have been pre-empted by the complainer's own
> actions.

Hah. Concision again.

> Most of the "voting implies consent" arguments I've heard of are based on
> the premise that "if you don't consent, you shouldn't vote" (morally or
> tactically).  Can you go from that to "if you _do_ vote, you consent"?
> Or is there another way to get to "if you vote, you consent"?

How about: if you delegate authority to an agent to act on your behalf, you are
responsible for his pursuant actions.