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\section*{Introduction: The Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being}

\section*{The Necessity, Structure, and Priority of the Question of Being}
\section{The Necessity of an Explicit Retrieve of the Question of Being}
The question of ``being'':
\begin{enumerate}
\item It is not the highest category, but is rather \emph{prior to} categorization.
\item It is not a circular question because ``being'' is not itself \emph{a} being.
\item It is not self-evident because our understanding of ``being'' does nothing to answer the question it supposedly renders useless.
\end{enumerate}
Indeed, the question of ``being'' must be reformulated and reunderstood to enable the construction of an answer.

\section{The Formal Structure of the Question of Being}
The question is seeking ``being'', so it must be guided there by our factical
but horizonless understanding of ``being''.  The question mustn't pursue causes
and origins of beings, since ``being'' is prior to beings, and not itself a
being.  A new conceptualization is needed.

How can the question find a horizonless concept?  By understanding it in terms
of the interrogator the question can see beings ``interrogated with regard to
their being'', see the being of the questioner.

The Da-sein, the ``being with regard to its being'', is the question's subject
of interrogation.  Is this circular?  ``A circle in reasoning cannot possibly
lie in the formulation of the question$\ldots$, because in answering this
question it is not a matter of grounding by deduction but rather of laying bare
and exhibiting the ground.''  The Da-sein is where the factical understanding
of ``being'' occurs.

\section{The Ontological Priority of the Question of Being}
Science's crucial paradigm shifts are brought about by crises in their basic
concepts.  This refers to a reunderstanding of their fundamental principles, in
a sense a reformation of their questions.  Sciences arise from the domains of
beings, so all of these questions rely on an investigation into the
constitution of their being.  Thus the investigation into ``being'' is prior to
all scientific investigation.  This priority must be understood as the
fundamental task of ontology---clarifying the meaning of ``being''.

\section{The Ontic Priority of the Question of Being}
Da-sein is ontically distinct in its ontological character.  Understanding the
question of existence ontically, through existence itself, is ``existentiell''
understanding.  Understanding the structure of existence ontologically, through
the ``possibility and necessity in the ontic constitution of Da-sein'', is
``existential''.  Science, understanding Da-sein's ``being in a world'',
requires an understanding of the being of the beings accessible in the world.
Ontologies exploring these beings are rooted in Da-sein's onticality.  This
brings us to the scene of our inquiry, where Da-sein always already understands
``being''---its ontic structure.  Fundamental ontology begins with an
existential analysis of Da-sein.

Da-sein is prior to all other beings in the investigation due to its
onticality, its ontological determination, and its ontic-ontological access to
the ontologies of other beings in a world.  Pre-ontological understanding of
being is what Da-sein brings to the interpretation of being.  It is not only
the first being to look to in this interpretation, but also that being which is
always already related to what is sought.

\section*{The Double Task in Working Out the Question of Being:\\The Method of
the Investigation and Its Outline}

\section{The Ontological Analysis of Da-sein as the Exposure of the Horizon for an Interpretation of the Meaning of Being in General}
How do we get proper access to the being of Da-sein?  Though ontically it is
immediately available, ontologically we must find Da-sein's being through the
world, since Da-sein is ``essentially, continually, and most closely related
to'' the world.  Da-sein must ``show itself to itself on its own
terms$\ldots$\mbox{}initially and for the most part---in its average
everydayness.''  This project is not intended to give a complete analysis of
Da-sein, but to know it enough to catch ``being'', since that first piece of
the puzzle is necessary for all ontological inquiry.

We must show how time is the horizon by which Da-sein understands being.  This
understanding of time and the common one will be shown to originate from
``temporality'', ``the being of Da-sein which understands being.''  Time is
commonly (na\"ively) understood to distinguish different regions of beings.
This understanding must be reevaluated.

The approach here, of understanding and conceiving being in terms of time,
reveals being as having temporal character.  Heidegger uses the term ``temporal
determination'' to clarify this determination of the meaning of being.

\section{The Task of a Destructuring of the History of Ontology}
Da-sein grows according to its past---its future is its past in that it grows
accustomed to an interpretation of itself and lives accordingly.  Da-sein
``occurs'', happens, in a manner enabling ``world history''.  The constitution
of this happening is called historicity, Da-sein's past, and \emph{it} is made
possible by temporality.  Historical Da-sein, Da-sein's inquiry into and
pursuit of its past (``tradition''), leads us to temporality.  Inquiry into
being is characterized by historicity.  The question must recognize and address
its historicity and come into possession of its past.  Da-sein is
simultaneously entangled in the world and its own tradition, meaning Da-sein
does not control the direction of its own inquiries and actions, particularly
those concerning ontology.  This tradition clouds the source of Da-sein's
existentiell understanding, and even that it exists or should be sought, even
in the pursuit of fundamental principles.  Greek ontology demonstrates how
Da-sein, free of traditional distractions, understands being in terms of the
world.  As this became tradition the question was considered as having been
answered by tradition, rendering Greek ontology as doctrine.  Philosophy
endures thanks to the soundness of its tradition's genesis, but fails where it
neglects the primacy of the genesis over the tradition.  In terms of the
question of being and its direction, we must take apart the tradition of
ancient ontology.  This is not to \emph{destroy} tradition, but to give it the
proper context.  Kant's investigation into time suffered from taking the
meaning of being for granted and from its rooting in Descartes' cogito.
Without the world, the cogito's ``sum'' has no way of establishing its meaning.

The Greeks moved from the dialectic, the replacement of Da-sein with ``z\=oon
logon echon'', to ``legein'' and ``noein'', apprehension of an objectively
present (in the world) being in its objective presence (in its ``presencing'',
its revealing of itself in its making present).  ``Ousia''---presence.

Okay, so destructure the tradition according to the question of being.

\section{The Phenomenological Method of the Investigation}
This ontology does not call itself ``ontology'' out of connection or obligation
to a particular philosophical discipline; this ontology is \emph{prior to} any
other philosophical inquiry.  The phenomenological treatment of the question
does not indicate work within any doctrine, but a method of philosophical
research.  That phenomenology is so surely and clearly dedicated to working
with ``the things themselves'' and not wacky metaphysics or arbitrary
frameworks should put any such concerns to rest.  We shall work out here a
Greek meaning of ``phenomenology'' in terms of its components and its whole:

a: The Concept of Phenomenon---
\begin{itemize}
\item Phenomenon---``what shows itself in itself, what is manifest''
\item Phenomena---``the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to light''
\item Phenomenon---``what looks like something, what `seems', `semblance'\,''
\item These definitions are connected, but we stick with the first one---it is not a semblance, but a being's showing of itself in accordance with its meaning.  This is \emph{not} ``appearance''!  Symptoms are the appearance of an illness---they show themselves and the illness, but the illness does not show itself.  Appearances are dependent upon phenomena.
\end{itemize}
b: The Concept of Logos---
\begin{itemize}
\item Logos---speech?  But what does \emph{that} mean?
\item d\=eloun---making manifest
\item apophainesthai---to let beings be unconcealed
\end{itemize}
c: The Preliminary Concept of Phenomenology---
\begin{itemize}
\item apophainesthai ta phainomena---``to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself''
\item Does this term, like ``theology'', say \emph{what} is being researched and what that contains?  \emph{No}.  It simply says that its objects are held such that they are directly considered.  Truth of being is concealed in that it does not show itself initially and for the most part, but it belongs to that which \emph{does} ``in such a way that it constitutes its meaning and ground.''
\end{itemize}

The phenomenological meaning of ``phenomenon'', self-showing, means the being
of beings.  Phenomenology is necessary to encounter phenomena, and is thus a
necessary part of ontology.  It is necessary because of how phenomena can be
occulted.  One's relation to a phenomenon can be one of ignorance, where it is
unknown and not known to be unknown.  A phenomenon can be known and then
covered over, wholly or in part.  When a previously discovered phenomenon is
thus distorted one risks deception.  This tends to occur whenever phenomena are
formalized in a system, even one as ubiquitous as speech.  To avoid this one
must carefully secure an ``\,`originary' and `intuitive' grasp and explication of
phenomena'' instead of a mere observation.

Phenomenal---``what is given and is explicable in the way we encounter the phenomenon''\\
Phenomenological---``everything that belongs to the manner of indication and explication, and constitutes the conceptual tools this research requires''

\section{The Outline of the Treatise}
We are trying to grasp being by first grasping Da-sein, finding there the
horizon for understanding and interpreting being.  First we will interpret
Da-sein according to temporality, then show time as the transcendental horizon
of the Quesion.  Second we will begin destructuring the history of ontology.

\section*{The Interpretation of Da-sein in Terms of Temporality}
\section*{Division One: The Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Da-sein}

\section*{The Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Da-sein}
\section{The Theme of the Analytic of Da-sein}
By ``existence'' we do not mean ``objective presence'' but the determination of
being of Da-sein.  Since the ``essence'' of Da-sein lies in this meaning of
``existence'', the way in which Da-sein is concerned with its being, it is
nonsense to talk of its being in terms of objectively present attributes in its
outward appearance but in terms of possible \emph{ways for it to be}.
``Da-sein'' does not express a \emph{what}, but a \emph{how}.  An objectively
present being is indifferent to its own being.  The possibility of Da-sein is
never a feature or attribute of Da-sein, but is rather Da-sein itself.  When
Da-sein is ``winning'' itself in its being we call it ``authentic'', but to be
authentic or inauthentic (to win, lose, or ignore itself) is always the choice
of Da-sein, a choice it has precisely because it is this possibility.  The
inauthentic moments are \emph{in no way} ``lesser''---they are some of the most
important.

Its ``existence'' as here described and its always-being-mine (Heidegger
stresses the importance of the first person) show how unique Da-sein is
phenomenally and phenomenologically.  Da-sein, in not being merely objectively
present, presents itself in a manner so unusual that we must take the time to
correctly present it.

Looking at the indifferent way in which Da-sein \emph{is} initially and for the
most part, we find a positive phenomenal characteristic of ``averageness''.
``Average everydayness'' is Da-sein's ``ontic immediacy''.  This ontically near
realm is ontologically the farthest and most difficult to grasp.
Existentiality is still here in average everydayness and inauthenticity, and
they are thus not mere ``aspects'' but relations to its being.

\begin{description}
\item[Existentials]---characteristics of being of Da-sein
\item[Categories]---determinations of being of beings unlike Da-sein.  From ``kategoresthai''---ontologically, to let a being be seen for everyone in its being.  What are thus brought to light are the ``kategoriai''.
\end{description}

``Existentials and categories are the two fundamental possibilities of the
characteristics of being.'' Their corresponding beings require different means
of interrogation---\emph{who} or \emph{what}, respectively.  Connecting the two
is part of the task before us.

Now we must demonstrate the urgency of the existential analytic of Da-sein, its
primacy over anthropology, psychology, and biology.

\section{How the Analytic of Da-sein is to be Distinguished from Anthropology,
Psychology, and Biology}
Anthropology, psychology, and biology are today too distant from the
ontological problematic.  Modern thought was shaped by Descartes' ``cogito
sum'', which expended much ink defining and determining the cogito without ever
questioning the sum.  More crucially, Descartes concerned himself with the
cogitare of the ``ego'', a subject fatally lacking the phenomenal content of
Da-sein.  Even when one considers a ``subject'' without asking the proper
ontological questions, that subject carries the being of beings along
underneath it, and no ontic questions will suffice until its thirst for
ontology is satisfied.  However we conceive of a being, we must keep ties to
ontology.  Scheler says a person is connected to acts---not objective presence,
but ``only to be experienced in the process itself and given in reflection.''
Even this does not penetrate beyond the ontology of action into the being of
Da-sein.  Traditional (Christian) anthropology looks to some inadequate
ontological foundations of personhood: the (still merely objectively present)
rational animal and the construction of man in God's image (saying that human
being has roots in something greater).  These Greek and theological definitions
do not question being at all, and ``the anthropological problematic remains
undetermined in its decisive ontological foundation.''

Psychology looks to anthropology, and biology's attempts to be a ``science of
life'' root it in Da-sein's ontology.  ``The ontology of life$\ldots$ determines
what must be the case if there can be anything like just-being-alive.'' Life is
ontologically undetermined, and not a foundation for Da-sein.

Anthropology, psychology, and biology accomplish what they do without adequate
ontology of Da-sein.  We see that ``hypotheses derived from empirical
material'' do not \emph{lead us to} ontological foundations but distract from
the ontological foundations always already ``there'' in the material.  Claiming
their self-evidence does nothing to address their importance.

\section{The Existential Analytic and the Interpretation of Primitime Da-sein:
The Difficulties in Securing a ``Natural Concept of the World''}
Primitive Da-sein can speak from a ``more primordial absorption in
`phenomena'.'' Though it seems crude and simple it can be of great use.
Primitive Da-sein is \emph{not} everydayness, which is a kind of being of
Da-sein found in highly developed culture.  Ethnology should not be looked to
for an understanding of human being.  Whatever positivistic disciplines or
philosophy herself have done to develop a ``natural concept of the world'', we
have shown that this mere ordering is a distraction from the real problem of
ontology, which will contribute indirectly to these disciplines but ultimately
pursues its own goal.

\section*{Being-in-the-World in General as the Fundamental Constitution of
Da-sein}
\section{A Preliminary Sketch of Being-in-the-World in Terms of the Orientation
toward Being-in as Such}
Mineness, the possibility of authenticity, inauthenticity, or ``modal
indifference'' to these.  These determinations of Da-sein's being are grounded
in being-in-the-world, a constitution of being which must be interpreted in
order to know where to begin.  While the term expresses a unified concept that
can't be broken down, we can look at it from different angles:

\begin{enumerate}
\item
``In-the-world''---this perspective demonstrates the need for defining ``worldliness'' and determining the ontological structure of the world. (Chapter 3)
\item
The ``being''---that which (who, actually) is in the way of being-in-the-world.  The average everydayness of Da-sein. (Chapter 4)
\item
``Being in''---the ontological constitution of in-ness. (Chapter 5)
\end{enumerate}

All three will have their time, but first we spend a little time on ``being
in''.  We talk of being-in \emph{something}, ``as water is `in' the glass''.
But this spatial sort of in-ness applies to beings that are objectively
present, related categorically.  These beings are unlike Da-sein.  For Da-sein,
being-in expresses an \emph{existential}. ``Being'' here is to dwell near and
be familiar with $\ldots$, and ``Being-in is the formal existential expression of
the being of Da-sein'', which is always being-in-the-world.

In terms of ``being with'', to say that two beings \emph{touch}, are somehow
together or that one is encountered by the other, both can not be merely
objectively present.  A world in which \emph{beings can be encountered} is
necessary for a being to be accessible in its objective presence in the first
place.  The ``worldless'' objects cannot be together with each other.  The way
in which Da-sein has being-in-the-world and sees itself as together with the
beings encountered in its world is called its \emph{facticity}.  Da-sein also
has its own kind of objective presence, a ``being-in-space'' grounded always in
its being-in-the-world.  Da-sein has \emph{existential spaciality}, in that its
inness is not that of an object placed in space but of a factical being
together with objects in the world.

Some ways of being-in refer to ``taking care of'' $\ldots$, indicating being with
a consideration of or apprehension about $\ldots$. ``Taking care'' is an
existential designating the being of a possible being-in-the-world. ``Care'' is
to be understood ontologically, not as emotion.  Da-sein is \emph{always} ``in
the world'', it cannot be in any other way than ``being-in''.  Being-in is
largely represented by \emph{knowing} the world.  Being-in-the-world's
connection with knowing the world must be examined as an existential of
being-in.

\section{The Exemplification of Being-in in a Founded Mode: Knowing the World}
Knowledge is not a relation between subject and object, but a relation between
Da-sein and world (and not in the same manner as that between subject and
object!).  We must thus characterize knowing as a phenomenon.  That being which
is known (nature) is not where the knowing is to be found, but in those beings
which know.  Knowing is neither objectively present nor apparent externally.
``Knowing is a mode of being of Da-sein as being-in-the-world'', but then what
is \emph{knowledge}? ``Being-in-the-world, as taking care of things, is
\emph{taken in by} the world which it takes care of.'' Knowing determines what
is objectively present, meaning there's been a ``deficiency'' of taking care of
the world and having to do with it.  It is to look at a being encountered in
its eidos (outward appearance), in a direction and from a perspective, and
dwelling with it independently to have a \emph{perception} of it.  Looking at a
being \emph{as} something, one interprets and defines it, enabling its
expression as a proposition.  This is not the kind of proposition so separate
from the world that we must ask as to its ``correspondence''.  This is not a
``reaching out of'' some inside for Da-sein, since Da-sein is always already
\emph{outside}.  This knowing is Da-sein staying inside and out.  Even
knowledge forgotten or muddled is ``a modification of primordial being-in''.
Knowing is a new perspective and possibility of being, a mode of Da-sein.  We
must now look \emph{prior to} being-in-the-world to understand it.

\section*{The Worldliness of the World}
\section{The Idea of the Worldliness of the World in General}
We start an analysis and grounding for being-in-the-world by exploring the
phenomenon of ``world''---that which shows itself as being and the structure of
being is a phenomenon, and we shall study the things ``in'' the world in these
terms, ``conceptually and categorically''.  ``Neither the ontic description of
innerworldly beings nor the ontological interpretation of the being of these
beings gets as such at the phenomenon of `world'.  In both kinds of access to
`objective being', `world' is already `presupposed' in various ways.''  Is
``world'' something subjective, something that is a character of being of
Da-sein?  But we are \emph{all in} a world, the \emph{same} world.  This must
be encuntered as the worldliness of world in general.  ``World'' is a terms
with many uses:

\begin{enumerate}
\item
The totality of beings objectively present.
\item
The being of beings or ranges of beings objectively present.
\item
That ``in which'' a factical Da-sein lives.
\item
Worldliness, that which can be modified into the respective structural
totality of particular ``worlds''.
\end{enumerate}

The expression world refers to meaning 3.  ``World'', with quotes, refers to
meaning 1.  Traditional ontology has ignored the phenomenon of worldliness and
being-in-the-world.  It has instead tried to interpret the world in terms of
nature, but ontologically beings can be discovered as nature only in a definite
mode of being-in-the-world.  Nature is so grounded in the concept of
worldliness that it cannot hope to render it intelligible, since it is itself
meaningless until worldliness is explained.

Average everydayness is the key.  We will look at Da-sein's nearest kind of
being to find how Da-sein skips over worldliness to know the world.

The worldliness of the surrounding world (environmentality) will be sought
through ontological analysis of the beings encountered therein.

The world ``around'' us takes on a spatial meaning, but this spatiality is not
primary and arises out of the concept of worldliness.  This analysis of
worldliness will stand is educational contrast to that of Descartes.

A: Analysis of Environmentality and Worldliness in General---
\section{The Being of Beings Encountered in the Surrounding World}
Everyday being-in-the-world is association in the world with innerworldly
beings.  The closest association is ``a handling, using, and taking care of
things which has its own kind of `knowledge'.''  By exploring
phenomenologically the beings that show themselves in this taking care and
looking to them with a phenomenological ``knowing'', we hope to determine the
structure of their being.  This brings about the understanding of being always
already possessed by Da-sein.  We must look to ``beings \emph{as} they are
encountered \emph{of} their own accord \emph{in} taking care,'' and by
rejecting ``interpretational tendencies'' we do not \emph{enter into} ``taking
care'' but \emph{go back} to it.  We look to ``things'' as our pre-phenomenal
basis, as our beings.

But it is tempting to consider a ``thing'' in terms of thingliness or reality
and ignore the pre-ontological way in which we take care of these things.  We
must look to useful things, and elucidate their kind of being.  ``Strictly
speaking, there `is' no such thing as a useful thing.  There always belongs to
the being of a useful thing a totality of useful things in which this useful
thing can be what it is.''  Useful means ``in order to$\ldots$'', which contains
a reference of one thing to another.  A room full of useful objects is not
encountered as spatial relations but as ``material for living''.  The totality
of useful things is encountered before any individual useful thing.

A ``useful thing's kind of being in which it reveals itself by itself'' we
shall call \emph{handiness}.  That useful things do not merely \emph{occur},
but have this ``being-in-themselves'' that they are handy.  To not just look at
outward appearance, not just look at things theoretically, but to associate
things in their ``in-order-to'' is \emph{circumspection}.

Everyday association looks not to the useful things, the tools, but to the
work, what is to be produced---the \emph{what-for}.  The work to be produced
has the kind of being of a useful things.  But following this backwards we find
that not everything has been produced this way---in smoe useful things we
discover ``nature'', products of nature.  A forest is timber, a mountain a
quarry, a river is power, and wind is ``the wind in the sails''.  The work also
points to the wearer/user of what is to be produced, ``he `is' there as the
work emerges''.  When a work is produced by the dozen, ``beings with the kind
of being of Da-sein for whom what is produced becomes handy'' are encountered
in the work, and along with them the world in which such beings live,
\emph{our} world.  The work taken care of is at hand now in the domestic world,
the public world, and the surrounding world of nature, since roads, bridges,
rooftops and lights all associate with nature.  This is not a mere spin, a
subjective coloration of beings objectively present.  If handiness turns out to
be the kind of being of beings first discovered within the world, we do not get
``world'' simply by connecting the beings.  How do we move from here to the
phenomenon of world?

\section{The Worldly Character of the Surrounding World Making ITself Known in
Innerworldly Beings}
World itself is prior to and necessary for innerworldly beings to be
encountered and discovered.  Does Da-sein's encounter with useful things in the
world point us to worldliness?  A useful thing, in no longer associating itself
properly with other useful things, becomes \emph{conspicuous} in its
unusability, unhandiness.  The change it has undergone is not the change in
qualities of a merely objectively present thing  When a thing is missing, not
at hand, unhandy, we suddenly find those things that \emph{are} at hand
\emph{obtrusive}.  Suddenly the objective presence of what is at hand is
discovered when we find ourselves helpless to affect it, when it loses its
association.  So when objective presence makes itself known it does so
alongside the handiness of useful things.  The usefulness takes its leave in
the form of conspicuousness, and handiness is shown alongside the worldly
character of what is at hand.  In a disruption of association we become
ontically aware of a thing's ``what-for'', and the totality of usefulness makes
itself known along with the world.  When the world appears in the modes of
taking care just interpreted, what is at hand loses its worldliness and appears
as something merely objectively present.

Being-in-itself happens where there is inconspicuousness, unobtrusiveness, and
nonobstinacy.  But world cannot do this.

Being-in-the-world is circumspection, absorption in the references of
handiness.  Taking care of things works from a familiarity with the world.
There are still questions, and we are still not ready to answer them.

\section{Reference and Signs}
Let us consider more deeply the phenomenon of \emph{reference}.  We wish to
find a useful thing in terms of which references can be found, and that useful
thing is a \emph{sign}.  Being-a-sign-for smoething can be formalized as a
universal kind of relation.  Looking to the sign itself as a useful thing, we
find its usefulness consists in \emph{indicating} or, very formally,
\emph{relating}.

Indicating is a subset of Reference is a subset of Relation.

Consider a turn signal---its usefulness is reference, indication.  That is, its
indicating can be taken as a kind of ``referring''.  This ``referring'' as
indicating is not the ontological structure of the sign as a useful thing but
rather the structure of being of useful things---\emph{serviceability for}.
Indicating's ``referral'' is the ``ontic concretion of the what-for of
serviceability, and determines a useful thing for that what-for.''
``Serviceability for'' is an ``ontological, categorical determination of the
useful thing \emph{as} useful thing.''  The sign shows the distinction between
referral as serviceability and referral an indicating.  ``Useful things which
indicate have an \emph{eminent} use in heedful association.'' This must be
clarified.

The meaning of a sign's indication can only be ascertained by defining the
appropriate way of associating with indicating things.  We must comprehend
their handiness.  The being toward a turn signal is ``yielding'' or ``standing
still'', with reference toward the car.  Da-sein is always ``underway'', and so
these ways of taking direction belong to Da-sein's being-in-the-world, as they
are boundary instances of its directed being.  When we see the sign as an
indicating thing that occurs, we do not ``comprehend'' it---comprehension is
not circumspection.  Circumspect overseeing ``acquires an orientation with the
surrounding world.'' Signs give us access to the context of what is at hand
such that heedful association secures an orientation.  Signs don't merely point
from one thing to another but they bring a totality of useful things to
circumspection along with the worldly character of what is at hand.  Signs
primarily indicate their own relevance.

Signs are established as useful things taking over the ``work'' of
\emph{letting} things at hand become \emph{conspicuous}.  Sometimes something
already at hand is ``taken as a sign''.  ``What is taken as a sign first
becomes accessible through its handiness.'' A farmer ``accepting'' the south
wind as a sign of rain is not adding meaning to a objectively present being but
is discovering the south wind in its being through circumspection, ``by taking
the lay of the land into account.''  How is a sign grasped before it is
established as a sign?  Is it merely occurring or was one ignorant of its use
up until now?  \emph{Usefulness not discovered by circumspection is not the
same as mere thingliness presented for the comprehension of something
objectively present.}

Signs' conspicuousness ``document the inconspicuousness constitutive for what
is at hand nearest to us''.  The sign ``takes its conspicuousness from the
inconspicuousness of the totality of useful things at hand in everydayness''.
A string around one's finger is narrowly intelligible and widely applicable,
and when its established use is forgotten its maker, the only one for whom it
is a sign, finds it obtrusive.

The coincidence of a sign with that which it indicates among primitive peoples
means the sign has not become free from that for which it is a sign.

The relation between sign and reference:
\begin{enumerate}
\item
The indicating is based upon the in-order-to (reference), as a
possible concretion of the what-for of serviceability.
\item
As the character of useful things at hand, the indicating of signs
belongs to a referential context (the totality of useful things).
\item
Signs make the surrounding world explicitly accessible to
circumspection in their handiness.
\end{enumerate}

Signs are ontically at hand, yet in their usefulness indicate the ontological
structure of handiness, referential totality, and worldliness.

Reference is not comprehensible as a sign if it is ontologically the foundation
for signs.

\section{Relevance and Significance: The Worldliness of the World}
Things at hand are at hand in terms of the world.  How is the freeing of what
is encountered within the world for circumspection the ontological distinction
of the world?

Things at hand are suited or unsuited for things, and their ``qualities'' (like
the ``indicating'' of a sign or the ``hammering'' of a hammer) are bound up
with that suitability in the same way objective presence is with handiness.

That things at hand have the structure of reference means they have the
character of being referred.  Reference is reciprocal---beings are relevant
\emph{together with} other beings.  Reference is ``together$\ldots$with$\ldots$''.

\emph{Relevance} is the being of innerworldly beings, and it is a relevance
\emph{about} the what-for of serviceability, which can itself be relevant.  A
hammer has to do with hammering has to do with fastening has to do with
protection against weather]  The protection ``is'' for the sake of a
possibility of Da-sein's being.  Which relevance a thing has is prefigured in
terms of the total relevance.  The total relevance leads back to a what-for
that has no relevance itself, it's ``not a being of the kind of being of things
at hand within a world, but is a being whose being is defined as
being-in-the-world, to whose constitution of being worldliness itself
belongs.''  This primary what-for isn't just another link of relevance, but a
``for-the-sake-of-which''.  The for-the-sake-of-which always points to the
being of Da-sein which is concerned about this being in its being.  Before
returning to this link from relevance to the being of Da-sein we must clarify
``letting something be relevant''.

An ``a priori'' letting be relevant means to discover a previously existing
being in its handiness and let it be encountered as the being of this being.
This is a very ontic encounter with beings.

An ontological letting be relevant means freeing every thing at hand, ontically
relevant or not, as a thing at hand and rather than ``letting it be'' as the
discovered being it is work over it, improve it, destroy it.  The previous
freeing of beings for their innerworldly handiness.  ``The with-what$\ldots$is
freed in terms of the together-with-what of relevance.''  When a being is
discovered in its being, it is always already a thing at hand in the
surrounding world rather than some kind of ``stuff'' objectively present and
nothing more.  Letting beings be relevant, freeing them for a totality of
relevance, has already disclosed that for which it is freeing.  That for which
things at hand are freed, made accessible as innerworldly beings, is not
discoverable if \emph{discoveredness} refers only to a possibility of being of
beings unlike Da-sein, since it (that for which this freeing happens) is
exactly the understanding of world to which Da-sein is always already related.

Da-sein is referred by the context of relations to an in-order-to in terms of a
potentiality-for-its-being, either authentic or inauthentic.  Da-sein is always
referred to the with-what of relevance, meaning it always already encounters
beings as things at hand.

Da-sein lets beings be encountered for the context in which it understands
itself.

The ``wherein of self-referential understanding'', that for which one lets
beings be encountered in the kind of being of relevance, is the
\emph{phenomenon of world}.

\emph{Worldliness} is the structure of that to whch Da-sein is referred.  Now
we must understand the ontological context of Da-sein's self-referral.  Da-sein
finds the context of things at hand along with its being---in its being Da-sein
has alway already referred itself to an encounter with a ``world''.  This
arises from a familiarity with significance, which gives Da-sein the
possibility to understand and interpret, even to use language.  I guess this
makes sense is S.31.  \emph{Understanding} holds the relations here considered
in ``a preliminary disclosure'', and I'm going to start working this out on the
next page.

Understanding---holds the relations of Da-sein to $\ldots$ in a preliminary
disclosure.  In its familiar being-in-relevance, understanding comes prior to
the disclosure as that within which the reference moves.  The relations
themselves can concern understanding, and the relational character of such
``referential relations'' is \emph{signifying}.

Da-sein ``signifies'' itself, gives itself to understand its being and
potentiality-of-being.  For-the-sake-of-which signifies in-order-to signifies
what-for signifies what-in, letting something be relevant.  These relations
form a totality, the signifying in which Da-sein primordially understands its
being-in-the-world.  This ``relational totality of signification'' is called
\emph{significance}.

Da-sein is the ontic condition of the possibility of the discovery of beings in
terms of their relevance in a world such that they can reveal themselves in
their in-itself.  This ``familiarity with significance'' means Da-sein, by
being, is always referred to (together with) a world.  Da-sein is essentially
referred.

The significations with which Da-sein is familiar include the possible
discovery of something life significations from itself, which lead to the
possibility of words and language.

The concern now is that characterizing the being of what is at hand and
worldliness as a referential context will jeapordize their ``substantial
being'' by turning them into relations, which are always ``something
thought''.  Does this turn the being of innerworldly beings into ``pure
thought''?

Here's a look at the different structures and dimensions of the ontological
problematic:

\begin{enumerate}
\item
Handiness---the being of the innerworldly beings initially encountered.
\item
Objective Presence---the being of beings that is found by discovering them
in their own right in going through beings initially encountered.
\item
The Worldliness of the World---the being of the ontic condition of the
possibility of discovering innerworldly beings in general.
\end{enumerate}

1 and 2 are categories concerning beings unlike Da-sein, but 3 is an
existential determination of Da-sein, of being-in-the-world.  The relations of
the in-order-to, for-the-sake-of, with-what, etc. of relevance can't be
mathematically functionalized phenomenally, and they are not mere thoughts
arising out of ``thinking'' but relations in which heedful circumspection
dwells.  Worldliness doesn't volatize the being of innerworldly beings because
they are only discoverable on the basis of worldliness.  This discovery is the
only way of making merely objectively present things accessible.

Now we'll pause to piss on Descartes.

B: Contrast between Our Analysis of Worldliness and Descartes' Interpretation
of the World---Descartes' interpretation of world begins with an innerworldly
being and never looks at the phenomenon of world again.  This extreme position
considers the world as \emph{extensio}, essentially the same as mere
spatiality.

Section 19 will discuss the determination of the ``world'' as \emph{res
extensa}.
Section 20 will discuss the foundations of this ontological determination.
Section 21 is a hermeneutical look at Cartesian ontology of ``world''.

\section{The Determination of the ``World'' as \emph{Res Extensa}}
At the outset Descartes splits the ego cogito into \emph{res cogitans}
(``spirit'') and \emph{res corporea} (``nature'').  Descartes is the foundation
of this messy ontology.  He calls the being of beings in themselves
\emph{substantia}---\emph{substantiality} is the being of beings as substance,
\emph{particular substances} are beings themselves.

he accesses substances through ``attributes'', properties which essentially
determine a substance's substantiality.  The \emph{res corporea} is constituted
by length, breadth, depth.  ``World'' is spatial attributes.  Extension must be
there for any other determination of being to happen.  Descartes figured that
every other property of substance (division, shape, motion) is contingent on
spatiality, extension.  This was also explanation for how a corporeal being can
change the distribution of its extension and present itself yet as the same
being (since it is the dame underlying extension).

Force, color, hardness, etc. are excluded since if they were essential features
then a being which shies away from the hand to evade touch and feeling would be
denied its corporeal being.  \emph{Extensio} is what persists in a substance
throughout all changes.  \emph{Remaining constant}.  What remains constant
characterizes the substantiality of the substance.

\section{The Fundaments of the Ontological Definition of the ``World''}
Substance means a being in need of no other being in order to be.  Whatever
satisfies this idea in its truest sense, that which in its being needs no other
being, is the \emph{ens perfectissimum}, a purey ontological meaning for
Descartes' ``Deus''.  Everything else for him needs to be produced and
sustained.  Thus the production of what is objectively present and the lack of
needing production are his horizon for understanding ``being''.  Everything
other than God is \emph{ens creatum}.  Though both are ``beings'', the gap
between \emph{ens perfectissimum} and \emph{ens creatum} is supposedly
``infinite''!  How broad this understanding of being is!  In light of this
broadness, some created beings are called substances in that they need God for
creation and sustenance but no other being of the ``world''---they need no
\emph{ens creatum}.  ``There are two such substances: \emph{res cogitans} and
\emph{res extensa}.''  When we say ``God is'' and ``the world is'', ``is''
cannot signify these beings in the same sense.  If it were univocal, the same
in both cases, their substantiality would be altered.  The difference in
meaning was considered ``understood'' and ``self-evident'', and the question
left unanswered.  Descartes claimed that ``No signification of this name
(substance) which would be common to God and his creation can be distinctly
understood.'' He even goes so far as to say (and Kant goes so far as to repeat)
that since being does not ``affect'' us it cannot be perceived.  This dismisses
the problematic of being entirely, and Descartes has to define substances some
other way.  So he says we must access beings not in terms of their being but
their attributes, and thinking and extension are the attributes used to access
\emph{res cogitans} and \emph{res corporea}, respectively.

\emph{Res extensa} achieves priority thusly, through an evasion of substance's
``most substantial attribute''.  Descartes muddies ontic and ontological
meanings in the ambiguous term ``substance'' since he is busy with the meanings
of words instead of working with ``the things themselves''.

\section{Hermeneutical Discussion of the Cartesian Ontology of the ``World''}
Descartes pretty much missed the point entirely.  We looked for a kind of being
before which provided access to the phenomenon of worldliness, so what kind of
being of Da-sein has the being as \emph{extensio} Descartes equates with that
of the ``world''?  Mathematical knowing, as deductive, necessary knowledge,
\emph{is} in the true sense, it \emph{remains constant}.  The being of the
``world'' is handed to it by an idea, innerworldly beings do not present their
\emph{own} being but that of an ungrounded idea of being as constant objective
presence.  Mathematical knowledge is not his basis for ontology, but rather the
kind of knowledge best suited to his ontological bias toward being as constant
objective presence.

Descartes dismisses knowledge from senses as unimportant---it does not let us
\emph{know} any being in its being, but merely helps humans use and protect
their bodies.  True knowing comes through \emph{intuition}, \emph{noein}.

He determines hardness as an unyielding of one object before another!  There is
no consideration of the actual \emph{experience} of hardness from that being,
just a change or lack of change in spatial relationships.

Though Descartes values ``intellective apprehension'' above all other form of
knowledge, by looking at being as constant objective presence he is unable to
ontologically consider attitudes of this being, Da-sein, to other beings.  Was
Descartes even equipped to find a definite innerworldly being and its being
with the world without having any understanding of the world, and thus
innerworldliness?  He wanted to raise the question, and he claimed to do so
radically, yet he remained stuck in the mud of traditional ontology.  In adding
value based on his ontological standpoints he adds nothing, since in looking to
their relation to the ``fundamental stratum'' of being for their value
Descartes is only once again looking back to his ontological bias for the
origin of ``good things''.  He can't even find the concept of handiness through
his idea of ``valuable'' qualities, since as close as he seems his love of
independent, constant objective presence resists relation and circumspection!
Now we see the structure of the critique of Cartesian ontology before us:

\begin{enumerate}
\item
Where does the constant passing over of the phenomenon of world come from,
and why is it so decisive for us?
\item
Why do innerworldly beings take over for it as the ontological theme?
\item
Why are they initially found in ``nature''?
\item
Why does the ``rounding out'' of this ontology happen through the phenomenon
of value?
\end{enumerate}

So Descartes may be fixable.  Well, that was fun!

C: The Aroundness of the Surrounding World and the Spatiality of Da-sein---What role does spatiality play in Da-sein, being-in-the-world, innerworldly
beings, and the world?
\section{The Spatiality of Innerworldly Things at Hand}
Innerworldly things at hand.  We need to determine the spatiality of things,
grasp it phenomenally and connect it to being.

When something is \emph{initially} at hand, it is at hand first and it is also
\emph{near}.  Handiness hints at this, but a thing can be near not by measuring
distance but in terms of handling, use, and circumspection.  Useful things are
not just there in space, but are installed and set up.  They are either in
\emph{place} or they \emph{lie around}, and neither means they are in arbitrary
spatial positions.  Place isn't a \emph{where} but a definite \emph{there} of a
useful thing \emph{belonging there}.  This refers to a belonging in a totality
of useful things.  The whereto of a possible belonging somewhere is the
\emph{region} of a thing.

Region is not just direction toward but orbit around.  The region must be
discovered before any possibility is to be had of finding \emph{places}.  The
orientation of places into regions constitutes the \emph{groundness} of beings
encountered initially in the surrounding world.  The spatiality of what is at
hand places these innerworldly beings for us, ``where'' a thing is is
discovered in terms of everyday associations and not a catalogue of cartesian
(coincidence?) coordinates.

The ``surrounding world'' doesn't ``settle in'' to an existing space---its
``worldliness articulates in its significance the relevant context of an actual
totality of places circumspectly referred to each other.''  The world discovers
its \emph{own} space!

That what is at hand can be encountered in its space of the surrounding world
is possible only because Da-sein is ``spatial'' in its being-in-the-world.

\section{The Spatiality of Being-in-the-World}
Da-sein is not a being at hand in a place and is not in a position in ``world
space''.  The spatiality of Da-sein's being-in shows itself in
\emph{de-distancing} and \emph{directionality}.  De-distancing is making
distance vanish.  As de-distancing, Da-sein is letting beings be encountered in
nearness.  Remoteness and distance are only discovered through this
de-distancing (an existential).  Two things can not be distant from each other,
since things are in their being incapable of de-distancing.  The measurable
distance between them is encountered by Da-sein in its de-distancing.  Da-sein
essentially brings things near, as our inventions indicate.

Estimated distances, though not explicitly precise, have their own definite
meanings in terms of Da-sein's everydayness.  ``Half an hour'', ``a stone's
throw'', these statements make no attempt to measure but rather demonstrate
their meaning in terms of heedful circumspection.  Even if we hear an
explicitly calculated ``official'' measurement we initially estimate it
circumspectly (``it's about three football fields long'').  What is at hand
isn't there for Berkeley's Big Brother, but for the circumspect, heedful
everydayness of Da-sein!  Knowledge of objective distances is blind to the
remoteness and nearness of what is at hand in the world.  These distances are
not ``subjective'' in terms of arbitrary conceptions of beings existing
otherwise in themselves, but the discovery of beings with which Da-sein as
existing is always already together in the world.

Da-sein, as always essentially de-distancing, associates in a slightly remote
distance from itself.  Spectacles, telephone receivers, and the road beneath
one's feet are all so near in their usefulness as to be almost totally
inconspicuous (until they become obstacles).  Da-sein is only ``here'' in that
it exists primarily ``over thre'', and comes back to itself.

Da-sein is spatial in that it encounters space by way of circumspection.  It
finds the distance ``between'' two things by de-distancing mhe distance.
Da-sein cannot ``cross over'' de-distancing.

Every bringing near takes a direction in a region from what is de-distanced, so
that its place may be found.  This is the character of \emph{directionality} in
Da-sein.  ``Circumspect heedfulness is a directional de-distancing.'' We now
understand ``signs'' as things that take over and direct us.  Directing and
de-distancing are modes of being-in-the-world guided by the circumspection of
heedfulness.

The feeling of right and left is not a ``difference between two sides'' but a
searching for things.  Left and right are directions, an orientation in a
world.  This directednes is grounded in directionality, which is grounded in
Da-sein's being-in-the-world.  Kant's worldless subject prevented him from
understanding orientation in this way.

\section{The Spatiality of Da-sein and Space}
Being-in-the-world, in the sense of letting innerworldly beings be encountered,
is ``giving space'', \emph{making room}, freeing things at hand for their
spatiality.  This is an existential of being-in-the-world.  Through the
spatiality thus encountered Da-sein discovers space.  Da-sein is primordially
spatial, and so space is encountered prior to encounters with other things in
the surrounding world.

Space cannot be conceived as having the kind of being of \emph{res extensa}, so
it can't be ontologically determined as a ``phenomenon'' of this \emph{res},
and it is not merely ``subjective'' like the \emph{res cogitans}.

Space isn't the phenomenon of world, and it doesn't show the primary
ontological character of the being of innerworldly beings.  To understand space
we must go back to the world, find how space and the spatiality of Da-sein's
being-in-the-world \emph{constitute} the world.

\section*{Being-in-the-World as Being-with and Being a Self: The ``They''}
Everyday Da-sein is taken in by its world.  The phenomenon anwering to the
question of ``who?'' is a mode of being of Da-sein.
\section{The Approach to the Existential Question of the Who of Da-sein}
\emph{Who} is Da-sein?  The who is that which stays the same as its mode of
behavior and experiences change.  That which maintains itself as identical.
Da-sein has something which presents itself as objective presence.  but this
isn't enough; this is the mode of being of a being unlike Da-sein.

Is the who of everyday Da-sein I myself?  Is it simple perceiving reflection?
We can say ontically that it is I with confidence, but ontologically we must
exercise greater care and doubt.  Also, we have already shown that an isolated
I without a world does not exist initially, is never given.  We must make
visible the phenomenon of Mitda-sein, what is nearest in everydayness, and
interpret it ontologically.  We must not be misled by ontic characteristics
when doing this.

So we shall interpret the ``I'' existentially!  Da-sein is itself in existing,
and existence (not objective presence) is the ``substance'' of human being.

\section{The \emph{Mitda-sein} of the Others and Everyday Being-with}
We talked before about useful things pointing to other people.  We encounter
these others as those for whom the useful things are at hand.  The world of
Da-sein frees beings that are not handy or objectively present, but \emph{have
the kind of being of Da-sein}.  They are \emph{like} the Da-sein that frees
them, there too and there with it.

These others are not distinguished from the I---they have the same kind of
being, are most importantly those from whom one does \emph{not} distinguish
oneself; one \emph{is} one!  Being-there-too$\ldots$ Da-sein is \emph{with} these
others \emph{existentially}.  Not in terms of objective presence with but
heedful circumspection with!  The world is always this one that is shared, a
\emph{with-world}.  Being-in is being-with, so the innerworldly being-in-itself
of others is Mitda-sein.

It is phenomenal fact that others are encountered in the surrounding world.
Da-sein finds \emph{itself} in its doing, in what it needs, expects, and takes
care of in the surrounding world.  Da-sein understands itself in terms of its
world, and this frequently includes Mitda-sein.  Mitda-sein are not encountered
as objectively present but ``at work'', in their being-in-the-world.  Even just
standing around without heedfulness or circumspection is an existential, and is
encountered as such.

Da-sein is essentially being-with.  That is to say, being-with existentially
determines Da-sein.  It does this even without an other factically present.
Being-alone is even just another way of being-with a deficient mode whose
possibility proves being-with.  Da-sein can be alone even when among many
others, in that their Mitda-sein is encountered in the mode of an outsider.

Being-with is in Da-sein, encountered by another as Mitda-sein.  Mitda-sein
does not have the kind of being of a useful thing, but is itself Da-sein.  It
is not \emph{taken care of}, but is instead a matter of \emph{concern}.
Initially and for the most part we live in deficient modes of concern, such as
passing-one-another-by or not-mattering-to-one-another.  This is the average
everyday being-with-one-another, and it shows inconspicuousness and
obviousness.

A positive concern can either take care of the other to the point of taking his
``care'' \emph{away} from him (leaving him dependent, separate from the
process, ``inheriting'' a finished product) or \emph{leap ahead} of the other
and return care to him.  This latter takes care of the other authentically as
Mitda-sein and the former as a \emph{what}.

Concern is guided by \emph{considerateness} and \emph{tolerance}.

Da-sein is being-with, ``is'' for the sake of others.  Others are disclosed
together with the being-with, are a part of worldliness as the
\emph{for-the-sake-of-which}.  This is how Mitda-sein shows itself in heedful
being in terms of the things at hand in the world.  Since the being of Da-sein
is being-with, and so when Da-sein circumspectly finds and takes care of things
it does so together with the other.  The other is initially disclosed in the
taking care of concern.

\section{Everyday Being One's Self and the They}
``In what is taken care of in the surrounding world, the others are encountered
as what they are; they \emph{are} what they do.''  Da-sein always compares
itself to others, concerns itself with the distance between itself and them.
Being-with-one-another has the character of \emph{distantiality}.  This
existential places the everyday possibilities of being of Da-sein in others'
care.  The others' influence, the \emph{they} (``das Man''), becomes more and
more inconspicuous the more Da-sein is drawn into it.  As we live like the
\emph{they} and relate more to it, we find the they more and more determining
our everydayness.  In this way, Da-sein is \emph{disburdened}.  Life is made
easy by recourse to the they, which everyone is in everydayness but which is
nobody.  The they is an existential.  The self of everyday Da-sein is the
\emph{they-self}, as opposed to the \emph{authentic self} found by ``breaking
up the disguises with which Da-sein cuts itself off from itself.''

Authentic being one's self is not separate from the they, but is an
existentiell modification of its existentiality.

The everyday kind of being, absorbed in the world, passes over the phenomenon
of world and replaces it with things, in their objective presence in the world.
This is how the ontological interpretation of being has been passed over for so
long.  Ironically, the they (which is in no way objectively present) is the
source of this misdirection.  Authentic being thus does not happen by running
or detaching from the they, since the authentic self has even less the
character of objective presence, but is an existentiel modification of the
existentiality of the they.

\section*{Being-in as Such}
\section{The Task of a Thematic Analysis of Being-in}
It's time to look back to being-in, both for a better understanding of b-i-t-w
and to begin understanding Da-sein's primordial being, care.  We have already
explained being-in-the-world as being together with the world (taking care of
things), being-with (concern), and being one's self (who).  Rather than
dissolving these into some single primordial relation, since they are all
already primordial we shall recognize them as \emph{equiprimordial}.

Being-in is not an expression of objective presence ``in'' another objectively
present thing, as an objectively present ``subject'' in an objectively present
``world'', but as a kind of being of Da-sein.  The phenomenon of being-in is
not a \emph{commercium between} objectively present things, it is not even the
``between'' itself, since there is nothing to be between.  We are not talking
of an excluded middle, but a whole that we must take care not to split.

Da-sein \emph{is} its there.  ``There'' happens where a being has disclosed
itself in its spatiality.  Da-sein discloses itself and is ``there'' for itself
together with the world.  This disclosure is \emph{aletheia}, revealing itself
\emph{as} being-in-the-world, to itself \emph{be} the clearing.  This is the
only way for objectively present things to even become accessible.  Da-sein
\emph{is} this disclosure, so we must explore and analyze being-in as
disclosure as well as how Da-sein is its ``there'', is its disclosure, in an
everyday way.

There are two equiprimordially constitutive existentials of the there:
\emph{attunement} and \emph{understanding}.  These are part A of the chapter,
and \emph{discourse}, which determines them, is part B.

A: The Existential Constitution of the There---\section{Da-sein as Attunement}
\emph{Attunement} is the ontological side of what we understand ontically as
being in a mood.  Da-sein is always in a mood---that is to say, \emph{not}
being in a mood is when Da-sein is tired of itself, when being manifests itself
as a burden.  ``Mood makes manifest `how one is and is coming along'\,'',
bringing being to its ``there''.

Da-sein is disclosed with its mood as being delivered to its being as what it
has to be. This disclosure doesn't mean to be known; Da-sein ontically and
existentielly \emph{evades} the being disclosed in moods.  This evasion unveils
Da-sein as being delivered over to the there---the there is disclosed in the
evasion.  This expresses the \emph{thrownness} of Da-sein into its there.
Da-sein is thrown into its there as being-in-the-world.  Thrownness suggests
the facticity of Da-sein's being delivered over.

Attunement brings Da-sein before itself.  Da-sein finds itself in attunement
not by seekingbut by fleeing mood discloses in the mode of tuning away from
thrownness.  First essential ontological characteristic of attunemnt:
``Attunement discloses Da-sein in its thrownness, initially and for the most
part in the mode of an evasive thing turning away.''  The there is disclosed in
Da-sein's evasion of the being disclosed in its mood.

This disclosure makes ``experiences'' possible.  Mood discloses
being-in-the-world and makes directedness possible.  Second essential
ontological characteristic of attunement: ``It is a fundamental existential
mode of being of the \emph{equiprimordial disclosedness} of world,
being-there-with, and existence because this disclosure itself is essentially
being-in-the-world.''

Being-in is existentially determined such that what it encounters
\emph{matters} to it according to its attunement, which discloses the world as
something one feels about in such and such a way.  Only something attuned as
fearing or fearless can encounter things at hand in terms of their threat.

This ``mattering'' that mood grants things is necessary even for sense
perceptions.  Attunement has a ``disclosive submission'' to world that allows
things that matter to be encountered.  This should not ``surrender science
ontically to `feeling'\,'', but demonstrate the role of directedness in
scientific inquiry.

The phenomenological interpretation of Da-sein must let it interpret itself.
We will demonstrate the phenomenon of attunement mor concretely as we find it
in the definite mode of fear.  We now interpret the most
existential-ontologically significant attunement of Da-sein, Angst.

\section{Fear as a Mode of Attunement}
Three aspects of fear: what we fear, fearing, and why we fear.  These belong
together, and bring attunement into the picture.  The fearsome thing is always
a thing in the world, something with the kind of being of handiness, objective
presence, or Mitda-sein.  The fearsome thing has the character of being
threatening.  It (1)shows itself in a context of relevance as harmful, which is
directed at a range of what can be affected.  This means (2)it comes from a
definite region, which (3)is and begets things that are ``uncanny''.  (4)Threat
indicates that the harmful thing is not here yet, but is comng nearer.  In
coming nearer, (5)the sense that it may or may not cause harm intensifies.
(6)The possibility that the harm never occurs does not reduce the fear, but
intensifies it.  Circumspection sees it as fearsome because it is in the
attunement of fear.  That is, fearfulness attumes the world as one in which
things can harm us.  Fear is always afraid of the fearful being itself,
Da-sein.  When we fear the loss of things, it is because ``Da-sein \emph{is} in
terms of \emph{what} it takes care of.'' This \emph{what} applies to Mitda-sein
as we \emph{fear for} someone.  As we fear something happning ``at any moment''
we feel \emph{alarm}.  When what we fear is unfamiliar, we feel \emph{horror}.
Alarm and horrow together are \emph{terror}.  There are so many others, because
Da-sein, if attuned in the mode of fearfulness, can encounter any situation
with fear.  Different attunements bring us to encounter the same situations
differently.

\section{Da-sein as Understanding}
``World is `there'; its \emph{Da-sein} is being-in.  Being-in is `there' as
that for the sake of which Da-sein is.''  The disclosure of being-in-the-world
in this for-the-sake-of-which is \emph{understanding}.  ``\emph{Significance}
is that for which world as such is disclosed.''

Ontically, understanding often means to grok, to be able to, to be ready to
$\ldots$.  Used existentially, the $\ldots$ ``is not a what, but being as
existing.''  Da-sein's existing as a potentiality of being comes from this
existential understanding.  Da-sein's ability to $\ldots$ is not \emph{tacked on}
to what it is, but rather it \emph{is} being-possible.  These possibilities are
concerning taking care of the ``world'', concern for others, and being itself,
for its own sake.  Attunement lines up definite possibilities for Da-sein,
since attunement always pushes Da-sein in some direction.  Da-sein's
possibility is still entrusted to itself.

Da-sein is in how it understands to be, through which it knows its
possibilities.  It knows these not through self-perception but because
understanding is the there whose being has this knowledge.  Understanding is
essentially attuned, surrendered to thrownness.  \emph{In understanding,
Da-sein is its there} and thus loses sight of itself for its there, so this
thrownness means Da-sein has always already failed to recognize itself, and
thus is always faced with the possibility of finding itself again.

The totality of relevance reveals itself as \emph{possible} connections of
things at hand, and even nature (as the ``unity'' of objective presence) is
only discoverable as one of its possibilities discloses itself.  Why does
understanding happen in terms of possibilities?  It has the existential
structure of \emph{project}, the ``existential constitution of being in the
realm of factical potentiality of being.''  Da-sein, as thrown, always has and
will understand itself in terms of possibilities as long as it is.  This does
\emph{not} mean that understanding thematically grasps the possibilities
themselves---that makes possibility a mere given.  Project lets possibility be
possibility, and as this, understanding is the mode of being of Da-sein in
which it \emph{is} its possibilities \emph{as possiblities}.

This kind of being means Da-sein is \emph{always} ``more'' than it actually is,
rendering attempts to ``catch'' it as objectively present problematic.  It's
never more than it factically is because it factically exists as its
possibilities.

The being of the there gets its constitution through understanding and prject,
\emph{is} what it does or does not become, and so it makes sense for it to
\emph{become} what it already \emph{is}.

Da-sein can understand itself as for-the-sake-of-which, as itself,
authentically, or it can understand itself inauthentically, in terms of the
world.  This does not mean Da-sein is cut off from itself, since ``world
belongs to its being a self as being-in-the-world.''

Understanding works as an existential meaning of \emph{sight}---not perception
with eyes or nonsensory awareness of objectively present things, but allowing
accessible beings to be encountered in themselves without being concealed.
Every sense does this in its own way.  Sight related to existence is
\emph{transparency}, not focus on a central self but simultaneous disclosure of
being-in-the-world in all its constitutive factors.

Attuned understanding.  Thrown project.  We must develop these existentials.

\section{Understanding and Interpretation}
\emph{Interpretation} comes existentially out of understanding, developing the
possibilities there projected.  We shall now pursue the phenomenon of
interpretation in the understanding of the world.  In taking care of things,
Da-sein learns to understand them in their relevance.  Thus out of
understanding the world in taking care of it Da-sein interprets it.  Things at
hand in circumspection are interpreted in their in-order-to, and taken care of
accordingly.  What has been thus \emph{explicitly} understood has the structure
of \emph{something as something}, meaning that circumspectly the thing as hand
is for $\ldots$, not just as a name but to understand it \emph{as} that which is
for $\ldots$.  To circumspectly ``see'' this thing \emph{as} a table, door, etc.
is not to interpret a \emph{statement}, but a seeing of what is at hand, a
process that is already understanding and interpretative.  When we fail to
understand something, fail to see the ``as'', it is not more primordial than
the \emph{simple} seeing, which understands, but a derivation from it, akin to
an obstacle.  The ``as'' is the \emph{a priori} existential constitution of
understanding.

Again we must clarify that interpretation \emph{by no means} merely ``tacks
on'' or ``adds'' meaning to some objectively present ``stuff''---the relevance
disclosed in understanding the world and made explicit through understanding is
there always already.

This ``making explicit'' means that, \emph{since} we always already understand
things at hand in terms of a totality of relevance, everyday, circumspect
interpretation is based on that \emph{fore-having}, grounded in
\emph{foresight} that works toward what has already been understood.

What is the structure of the ``fore''?  How is it related to the ``as''?

When Da-sein discovers innerworldly beings, understands them, we say they have
\emph{meaning}, since they ``can be articulated in disclosure that
understands''.  Meaning is structured by fore-having, fore-sight, and
fore-conception, and something becomes intelligible as something in terms of
meaning.  Meaning is an existential of Da-sein, is exclusive to Da-sein, is the
fulfillment of being-in-the-world through the beings discoverable in the world.
Only Da-sein can be meaningful or meaningless.  This is, again, \emph{not} a
value judgement.

Now this business of fore-conception is distressing, since it suggests a
circularity in understanding.  The circle of understanding is the expression of
the existential \emph{fore}-structure of Da-sein, and we thus must be aware of
the primordial knowledge therein.  Fore-having, fore-sight, and
fore-conception---these are not to be established carelessly and arbitrarily
but through working in terms of the things themselves.  Understanding is
existentially the potentiality for being of Da-sein, and this is not the place
for rigorous exactness!

\section{Statement as a Derivative Mode of Interpretation}
Statement (which we have encountered already in its modification of the ``as'')
is profoundly connected with the ontological problematic, as any look into the
role of \emph{truth} as \emph{logos} in ancient ontology will attest.  These
three significations of the term \emph{statement} are interconnected and
comprise its full structure.

\begin{enumerate}
\item
\emph{Pointing out}, as in the primordial meaning of \emph{logos} as
\emph{apophansis}---letting beings be seen from themselves.  Statements not as
meaning containers but for accessing beings in their modes of beig (even such
as handiness).  Pointing out always designates beings themselves rather than
mere representations.
\item
\emph{Predication}---statement \emph{about} a ``subject''.  What is stated
here in ``the hammer is too heavy'' is the ``hammer itself'', not in the
subject but stated \emph{by} the predicate, by the ``too heavy''.  This is a
narrowing of pointing out, predications ``are'' as they do their pointing out.
Subjects are \emph{determined} by predicates.  This determination \emph{limits}
seeing to what shows itself, as a mode of pointing out.  When it faces
something already manifest it dims beings down and lets the beings be seen in
their definite character (the hammer's heaviness).
\item
\emph{Communication}, letting someone see with us what has been pointed out
and predicated.  What is ``shared'' is the \emph{being toward} what is pointed
out, a being-in-the-world where the world is that from which what is pointed
out is encountered.  Further retelling can change what is pointed out as the
statement's being toward is not to the original being talked about but instead
what is heard.
\end{enumerate}

In our discussion of meaning we will ignore the confused and arbitrary
phenomenon of ``validity'' and make to attempt to restrict meaning's conception
to ``judgement'', but we will understand it as that which makes visible ``the
formal framework of what can be disclosed in understanding and articulated in
interpretation.''

So what is the unified phenomenon these three significations comprise?
``Statement is a pointing out which communicates and defines.''  Now for the
statement to be a mode of interpretation, some things have to hold true.  We
see that statements on their own cannot disclose beings in general, but always
work from a being-in-the-world.  What is pointed out in determining works from
something already disclosed.  Determining begins with directedness, inheriting
the direction in which beings are envisaged, predicates are loosened.  Just
like interpretatio, the statement begins with fore-having, fore-sight, and
fore-conception.  But it is a \emph{derivative} mode of interpretation.  When a
hammer is too heavy one might state it any different way, but every statement
operates under the presupposition of a more primordial interpretaion that is
inherent in circumspectly and heedfully exchanging the hammer for a more
appropriate one.  How does the statement originate from this?  With the hammer,
something at hand for $\ldots$ becomes that ``about which'' the statement is
made.  The being is held in fore-having, but fore-sight looks to objective
presence.  This objective presence covers over handiness in the statement and
the ``as'' moves from reaching out into circumspection and the surrounding
world, only seeing what is objectively present and what objectively present
things can be determined from it.  The statement turns the ``as'' of
circumspect interpretation into the determination of objective presence.  The
former ``as'' is existential-\emph{hermeneutical} and the latter is
\emph{apophantical}.  But every statement has its origin in circumspect
interpretation, so attempts to reduce them to theoretical propositional
statements distort their meanings.  Aristotle conceived \emph{logos} as
\emph{synthesis} and \emph{diairesis}, binding and separating.  This is the
phenomenon of ``something as something'', where the somethings ar eunderstood
together and taken apart.  \emph{Synthesis} and \emph{diairesis} are
``relating''.  This shows us how the ``logic'' of \emph{logos} is rooted in the
existential analytic of Da-sein.

\section{Da-sein and Discourse: Language}
Existentially equiprimordial with attunement and understanding is
\emph{discourse}.  What is articulated in speech is meaning, and what is
articulated in discourse is the totality of significations.  Discourse is the
articulation of the intelligibility of the there.  This connection to
disclosedness grounds discourse in the world, gives it a \emph{worldly} mode of
being.  Discourse is an expression of the attuned intelligibility of
being-in-the-world.  ``Words accrue to significations.  but word-things are not
provided with significations.''  Discourse is expressed in language, a totality
of words.  Through language discourse can be found as an innerworldly being.

Discourse maintains itself in a particular way of heedful
being-with-one-another, talking in assenting, warning, interceding, etc.  It is
discourse about $\ldots$, it \emph{communicates}.  Communication is not a giving
or sharing of experiences, opinions, or wishes from inside one being to inside
another.  Communication is a being-with that already exists, being made
explicit, grasped, and appropriated through discourse.  All communicating
discourse \emph{expresses itself}, not from the inside as though cut off
intially and isolated from the outside but because as being-in-the-world it is
already ``outside'' as understanding.  That is the ``itself'' being expressed:
attunement, being outside, the there.  Attunement is made known poetically,
through ``the way of speaking''.

What discourse is about, what is said, communication, and making known.  These
are not properties taken from language but rather they are existential
characteristics of Da-sein that make language ontologically possible.  Thus we
cannot grasp ``the essence of language'', cannot arrive at a definition of
language by putting these together as though they are pieces of the whole---we
must first develop the structure of discourse according to the analytic of
Da-sein.

Hearing is an existential possibility of discourse.  ``Listening to $\ldots$ is
the existential being-open of Da-sein as being-with for the other.''  ``Da-sein
hears because it understands.'' Da-sein is being-in-the-world that understands,
along with Mitda-sein, and so listens and belongs to itself and others,
listening to each other.  This listening to each other is the grounding for
being-with, and has the possibilities for following, agreeing, not hearing,
defying, etc.  What we hear are things, not bundles of ``simple ideas', a
chaotic swirl of pure sensation.  We hear a wagon or a motorcycle, and in
discouse we initially understand what is said in the same way!  Even if we
don't understand it, what we hear is understood as unintelligible words.
Da-sein, more primordially than hearing, \emph{hearkens}.  Understanding
doesn't come from talking or listening, listening comes from understanding and
being-with!  Talking about something too much covers up understanding and gives
false sensations of clarity.  \emph{Keeping silent} ``lets something be
understood'' in an authentic way, so long as it is the reticence of someone who
has something to say, so long as it happens in discourse.  It allows for a
genuinely transparent being-with-one-another.

The Greek emphasis on \emph{zoon logon echon} arises from the fact that Da-sein
as discoursing being-in has already expressed itself---it is a statement of
language's ontological role.  Understanding it as ``rational living being''
ignores the phenomenal basis.  Grammar and categories look to the statement and
objective presence.  Philosophy needs to look at language in its ontological
character.

Now we will use all this and more to find a more ontologically primordial view
of the everydayness of Da-sein.

B: The Everyday Being of the There and the Falling Prey of Da-sein---We will find thrownness through everydayness, which is found in Da-sein's
possibilities as the they.
\section{Idle Talk}
Time to ask about the mode of being of discourse that expresses itself.  What
is its being, and what does that tell us about everydayness?  Discourse
expressing itself is communication.  In this language that expresses oneself
there is an average intelligibility through which a listener can understand the
discourse communicated without coming to a being toward what is being talked
about, can achieve a primordial understanding, approximate and superficial.
Listener and speaker mean the same thing because they understand what is said
in the same averageness.

Since hearing and understanding happen befor ewhat is spoken about, before
communication, the being-said, the \emph{dictum}, guarantees the genuineness of
the understanding belonging to discourse.  In an average understanding
discourse communicates through \emph{gossip} and \emph{passing the word along},
and becomes more authoritative the wider it is spread.  This is idle talk.  The
average understanding neither wants nor needs distinction between mere gossip
and grounded discourse, since it understands everything.  It spares us the job
of genuine understanding and develops an indifferent intelligibiliti that
leaves nothing incomprehensible.  Idle talk is not deliberate deceit, it does
not have the kind of being of \emph{consciously passing off} something as
something else.  Idle talk is a closing off, it \emph{omits} going back to the
foundation of what is being talked about.  Worse, it thinks it \emph{has} gone
back, and discourages further investigation.  Da-sein does this all the time,
is always working in, from, and against everyday understanding.  Public
interpretation, the they, always decides the possibilities of Da-sein's
attunement.  The ``obviousness and self-assurance'' of the average way of being
interpreted conceals Da-sein's plummet into groundlessness from itself.

\section{Curiosity}
Da-sein has a tendency toward ``seeing'', toward genuinely appropriating beings
in relation to its possibilities of being, called \emph{curiosity}, which
happens in an everyday way.  In rest, circumspection turns away from its work
and rout eof procedure and becomes free.  Care becomes free circumspection
which has nothing to bring near, and it makes what is nearest at hand suddenly
distant, near only in \emph{outward appearance}.  Free curiosity does not see
to understand; it sees merely to see.  It leaps around, not staying with what
is nearest but moving from novelty to novelty, maintaining the possibility of
\emph{distraction}.  Curiosity \emph{never dwells anywhere}, is everywhere and
nowhere.  When in the mode of being-in-the-world of curiosity, everyday Da-sein
consantly uproots itself.  Discourse and sight, idle talk and curiosity,
understand everything and see everything in a supposedly genuine way.  When
this genuineness is supposed, a third phenomenon appears to disclose everyday
Da-sein.

\section{Ambiguity}
Suddenly there is \emph{ambiguity} as to what is genuine understanding and what
is not.  Also, not only does everyone already understand what is the case but
they also know what needs to be done and what others think and feel.  Idle talk
is indignant toward ``what needs to be done'' actually happening; everyone
knows they could have done the same, since they figured it out, and when
something is done there is no more opportunity for guessing.  Idle talk is so
quick and new in its distractedness anyway that it leaves behind any actual
doing.  Ambiguity passes talking and guessing off as what is happening and
calls taking action something unimportant which comes after.  Idle talk
intrudes into being-with-one-another and causes us to keep tabs on one another.
This comes not from Da-sein but from the thrownness of being-with-one-another.

The horizon of all these structures reveals to us the basic kind of being of
everydayness.

\section{Falling Prey and Thrownness}
Idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity reveal a basic kind of the being of
everydayness called the \emph{entanglement} of Da-sein, meaning that Da-sein is
\emph{together with} the ``world'' it takes care of.  Da-sein has the
possibility of being itself, meaning that it has initially fallen prey to the
``world'' and become lost in the publicness of the they.  Thus idle talk,
curiosity, and ambiguity guide us into an inauthentic being-with-one-another.
``Inauthentic'' does not mean that Da-sein totally loses its being in everyday
being, it is simple a \emph{kind} of being-in-the-world which is totally taken
in by the world, Mitda-sein, and the they.  Not-being-its-self is a
\emph{positive} possibility of beings absorbed in and taking care of a world.
This \emph{nonbeing} is actually the kind of being nearest to and most common
for Da-sein.  Entanglement is not a ``fall'' from a purer and higher
``primordial condition''.  Da-sein, in falling prey, falls \emph{away from
itself}, has already done so in its factical being-in-the-world, and falls
prety to the \emph{world} belonging to its being.  This is an existential
determination of Da-sein itself, not a statement about objectively present
relations or some horrible ontic quality society ought to move beyond.

Being-in-the-world presents Da-sein with the possibility in idle talk and
public interpretedness of losing itself in the they, with the constant
temptation of falling prey.  Bein-in-the-world is \emph{tempting}.  Idle talk
as having-seen-everything and ambiguity as having-understood-everything
convince Da-sein that it knows the full breadth of possibilities of its being
and that it is leading a full and genuine ``life''.  By convincing Da-sein that
everything is in ``the best order'', entangled being-in-the-world is
\emph{tranquilizing}.  As it ``understands'' everything, Da-sein compares
itself with everything and thus conceals its ownmost potentiality for
being-in-the-world.  Entangled being-in-the-world is also \emph{alienating}!

Rather than driving Da-sein from itself, this alienation drives Da-sein into
itself in a ``self-dissection'' that explores countless possibilities of
interpretation, entangling it in itself.  Da-sein \emph{plunges} out of itself
into itself, into inauthentic everydayness.  Understanding is constantly town
away from authenticity into the they, still pretending to be authentic.  In
fallig prey, Da-sein in \emph{eddying}.

Da-sein remains in the throw, is sucked into the eddy of the they's
inauthenticity, because of its facticity.  Thrownness belongs to Da-sein, which
is always concerned in its being about that being.  This only contradicts
itself if Da-sein is an I-subject separate from the world, which it is not.
``Da-sein \emph{can} fall prety \emph{only} because it is concerned with
understanding, attuned being-in-the-world.'' \emph{Authentic} existence is
existentially just a modified form of everydayness.

Now we pick apart care with the same infuriating depth and intensity.

\section*{Care as the Being of Da-sein}
\section{The Question of the Primordial Totality of the Structural Whole of
Da-sein}
Being-in-the-world is \emph{whole}.  How is the totality of this whole to be
determined existentially?  Da-sein is \emph{disclosed} to itself in thrownness,
its mode in which it always \emph{is} its possibilities.  Being-in-the-world is
always for itself, but this self is the inauthentic they-self, so
being-in-the-world is always \emph{entangled}.  Da-sein is
\emph{entangled-disclosed}, concerned with its ownmost potentiality of being
together with the ``world'' and in being-with with the others.

But we won't get what we want by ``cobbling together elements''.  We must
pursue it according to that understanding attunement in which Da-sein is
disclosed to itself in the \emph{most far-reaching} and \emph{most primordial}
way---Angst.  This will be worked from as a form of entanglement rather than
fear.  ``Its being reveals itself as \emph{care}.''  We now have to demonstrate
that as soon as Da-sein expresses anything about itself it has already
interpreted itself pre-ontologically as \emph{care}.  Then we go all over the
fucking place, and I'll cross theose bridges when I come to them.  Seriously,
\emph{JESUS}.

\section{The Fundamental Attunement of \emph{Angst} as an Eminent Disclosedness
of Da-sein}
How is Da-sein brought before itself in \emph{Angst} through its own being in a
way that phenomenologically defines the being there disclosed in its being?

Da-sein can flee from itself because it is brought before itself in the first
place.  So while existentielly entanglement leads \emph{away from} Da-sein,
existentially and ontologically there is a turning \emph{toward} what Da0sein
flees in a phenomenologically interpretive way.  In fact, this fleeing ensures
that when orienting our analysis toward the phenomenon of entanglement we will
not find an artificial self-conception of Da-sein.  So all this has some merit,
and it's time to really look at \emph{Angst}.

``In falling prey, Da-sein turns away from itself.''  This shrinking back isn't
fear---it shrinks back from \emph{itself}, and what is ``fearsome'' is always
an innerworldly being.  Da-sein is threatened by a being with the same kind of
being as itself, a turning away based on \emph{Angst} which makes fear
possible.  Once has \emph{Angst} about being-in-the-world itself.  In
\emph{Angst}, ``the totality of relevance discovered within the world of things
at hand and objectively present'' is insignificant, is not relevant to the
threat.  There is no ``over there'' for what is threatening because it is
\emph{nowhere}, comes from no direction within nearness, is already ``there''
and yet nowhere at all.  What is innerworldly is so insignificant that the only
worldly thing left is the world itself, and that is what \emph{Angst} is about.
The world itself, ``the \emph{possibility} of things at hand in general.''
What is ontically ``nothing at all'' is ``none of the things at hand'', or
rather the primordial ``something'' of the \emph{world}.  The world
ontologically belongs to the being of Da-sein as being-in-the-world.  ``That
about which \emph{Angst} is anxious is being-in-the-world itself.''
\emph{Angst}, as not-having things at hand or Mitda-sein, removes the
possibility of understanding, of falling prey.  Da-sein is thrown back on its
authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world.  Being-with $\ldots$, being
familiar with $\ldots$, and the tranquilized self-assurance in the everyday
publicness of the they are a ``being-at-home'' standing in contradistinction to
the \emph{uncanniness} felt in \emph{Angst}.  ``Being-in enters the existential
`mode' of \emph{not-being-at-home}.'' The flight of falling prey is
\emph{toward} innerworldly beings where ``taking care of things, lost in the
they, can linger in tranquillized familiarity''.  \emph{Angst} is essential to
being-in-the-world, and is thus more primordial than everydayness.  Familiar
being-in-the-world is a mode of the uncanniness of Da-sein.

The unique individualizing of \emph{Angst} fetches Da-sein out of falling prey
and reveals authenticity and inauthenticity as possibilities of its being.

\section{The Being of Da-sein as Care}
The complete phenomenon of \emph{Angst}, characterized equiprimordially by
existentiality, facticity, and falling prey, constitutes the totality of the
structural whole of Da-sein.  As Da-sein looks to its potentiality-for-being,
it is ``beyond itself'', it is in a state of \emph{being-ahead-of-itself}.
This isn't something done by a worldless ``subject''---it is
\emph{being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world}.  The referential
totality of the in-order-to isn't an objectively present world attached to a
subject but the phenomenal expression of Da-sein's primordial wholeness.
``Existentiality is essentially determined by facticity.''  In
being-ahead-of-oneself-already-being-in-a-the-world, one is essentially already
in entangled \emph{being-together}-with innerworldly handy things taken care
of.  Here's our structure!

Being-ahead-of-oneself-already in as being-together-with.  This demonstrates
the full significance of \emph{care}, used ontologically.  Da-sein has the
possibility of \emph{being free for} athentic existentiell possibilities, a
freedom which allows Da-sein to be related to its possibilities
\emph{unwillingly} and inauthentically, being-ahead-of-itself where the
``self'' is the they-self.  Since Da-sein's potentiality-for-being has the mode
of being of being-in-the-world it is there that the relation to innerworldly
beings is.  \emph{Willing} grasps somehing understood as something to be taken
care of or ``brought to its being through concern.''  Something willed comes
out of a for-the-sake-of-which, and through willing we can see the underlying
totality of care showing.

Da-sein's projecting is together with a world, where from it takes its
possibilities.  Average trnquillized everydayness levels down these
possibilities, spurring busyness to create the illusion that something is
happening when in fact no new possibilities are being willed.  This
tranquillized ``willing'' is a modification of being toward one's
potentiality-for-being where being toward possibilities becomes an act of
\emph{wishing}, where possibilities are ungrasped and unexpected.  In wishing
what is available is never enough, and is lost sight of.  Wishing \emph{hankers
after} possibilities, an act which simultaneously \emph{closes off} factical
possibilities.  What is ``there'' in wishful hankering, what is ``never
enough'' becomes the ``real world''.  Wishing, like willing, presupposes care.
Hankering modifies being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in into
being-in-he-world-already-among-$\ldots$, revealing Da-sein's \emph{predilection}
to be ``lived'' by the world in which it actually is.  In predilection one is
drawn in by what is hankered after.  The \emph{urge} ``to live'' is ``toward at
any cost''.  It crowds out other possibilities.  Both urge and predilection are
rooted in thrownness, and can't be removed.  They are also ontologically based
in care, which ontically modifies them as something authentic.

Now to show that this ontologically ``new'' concept of care is not contrived,
but is actually very old and familiar.

\section{Confirmation of the Existential Interpretation of Da-sein as Care in
Terms of the Pre-ontological Self-interpretation of Da-sein}
Uh... citations and reiterations.  Nothing interesting.  Wow.  I guess mostly h
shows old understandings of the term ``\emph{cura}'' which demonstrate old
pre-ontological musings on care as the stuff of human lives.  Or they heal
around a thousand hit points.

\section{Da-sein, Worldliness, and Reality}
We've touched before on objective presence as smoething that is true, is
encountered, and is a part of Da-sein's being and being in general.  It
sometimes starts to sound like an alternate take on or misunderstanding of
being, but objectively present \emph{reality} is not ``\emph{one} kind of being
\emph{among} others'', but something that ``stands ontologically in a definite
foundational context with Da-sein, world, and handiness.''  It's time to tackle
the \emph{problem of reality}. We do this by examining

\begin{description}
\item[a:] Reality as a Problem of Being and the Demonstrability of the ``External
World''
\item[b:] Reality as an Ontological Problem
\item[c:] Reality and Care
\end{description}

with regard to the question of fundamental ontology.

A---What does reality signify?  This has often been bundled with ``the external
world'', sothat what is looked to is that which is ``independent'' or
``external'' to our consciousness.  Still, the means of grasping it is said to
be intuitive cognition, an act of the consciousness.  To grasp transcendence we
must grap the ``independence'' from consciousness of the real as well as to
what extent this consciousness is \emph{itself} clarified with regard to its
\emph{being}.  Then we may ontologically grasp the kind of being of
transcendence and whether cognition is up to the task of accessing what is
real.

The nature of Da-sein throws a gargantuan spanner in the works of this inquiry.
Cognition is founded upon innerworldly beings; they are the means of accessing
reality, and such access happens based ontologically on being-in-the-world,
which is care.  Da-sein has already accessed the world in its being!  Objective
presence can be covered over, but it is still only discoverable on the basis of
the world already disclosed, is only even \emph{concealable} on this basis!  We
are in a spot.  Kant complains about how we can't prove the existence of these
things outside of us, and then... Well, now we're getting into it again.

Time indicates something objectively present that persists, but it's not me
because my own ``existence'' (Kant uses the term for objective presence) in
time is detrmined according to it.  What it is is the possibility of te
objectively present change ``in me''.  ``The experience of the being-in-time of
representations equiprimordially posits changing things `in me' and persisting
things `outside of me'.''  Of course, the very language used stinks like shit.

Ah!  And here he says it at last: ``The objective presence together of the
physical and the psychichal is ontically and ontologically completely different
from the phenomenon of being-in-the-world.''  Fuck, dude, you can ignore
everything before that sentence.  Proofs such as Kant desired miss the point,
as usual.  Da-sein already \emph{is} in its being what Kant is trying to prove
for it, and what Kant is trying to work from is not up to the task.  Appeals to
faith are still trying to satisfy demand for such proofs, thus maintaining all
the faulty presuppositions.

Being-in-the-world does not deny or refute the real objective presence of the
external world, but it does deny the need or possibility for a proof of the
``world's'' reality.  Oh, thank CHRIST.  We get to go back into the existential
analytic, back into ontology.  Fuck you for this, Marty.

B---Dilthey describes reality as \emph{resistance}, something experienced in
impulse and will.  Impuls and will are \emph{out to get} $\ldots$ and they
encounter resistance, which means this is \emph{together with} a totality of
relevance.  ``$\ldots$[T]he discovery of resistance in striving, is ontologically
possible only on the basis of the disclosedness of world.'' Furthermore, this
striving is a modification of care, not something that ``emerges'' on its own.
And so, uh, FUCK DESCARTES.

C---Still not saying shit.  Time to cut rope from this shitty section.

\section{Da-sein, Disclosedness, and Truth}
Truth!  It's wound up with being and Da-sein, with Da-sein's understanding of
being.

a: The Traditional Concept of Truth and its Ontological Foundations---Starting
with Aristotle, truth was accepted as the agreement of a proposition
(judgement) with its object.  Well, every ``agreement'' is a relation, yet we
are trying to relate something \emph{real} with something \emph{ideal}, a
problem by now too familiar.  Really what is demonstrated is the
being-discovered of the being itself, ``\emph{that being} in the how of its
being discovered.'' The being itself is what is stated.

A true statement discovers the beings in themselves, letting them ``be seen''
in their discoveredness.  A statement's \emph{truth} is understood as
\emph{discovering}.  This is not agreement as with correspondence of one being
to another.  Hey, guess what!  This all depends on being-in-the-world!

b: The Primordial Phenomenon of Truth and the Derivative Character of the
Traditional Concept of Truth---Truth means to-be-discovering, unconcealment.
The phenomenon of truth is witnessed most primordially in the ontological
foundations of discovering.  Da-sein is discovering, and innerworldly beings
taken care of are discovered.  Only through the disclosedness of Da-sein is the
\emph{most primordial} phenomenon of truth attained.  Da-sein is ``true'',
\emph{is ``in the truth''} in that it \emph{is} its disclosedness.  This truth
isn't some all-encompassing, omniscient Logos in the sky---it simply means that
``the disclosedness of its ownmost being belongs to its existential
constitution.'' What this means is:

\begin{enumerate}
\item
\emph{Disclosedness in general} is essential to the constitution of
Da-sein's being.  The phenomenon of care has made explicit the totality of the
structure of being.  Care belongs to both being-in-the-world and being together
with innerworldly beings.
\item
\emph{Thrownness} reveals that Da-sein is in a definite world ``together with
a definite range of definite innerworldly beings.  Disclosedness is essentially
factical.''
\item
\emph{Project} is disclosing being toward Da-sein's own
potentiality-of-being.  Da-sein understands itself in terms of the ``world'',
others, or in terms of this potentiality.  The latter possibility means Da-sein
discloses itself to itself in and as this potentiality.  This is an
\emph{authentic} disclosedness of primordial truth in authenticity, and the
most primordial and authentic disclosedness in which Da-sein can be in this way
is the \emph{truth of existence}.  So basically it's only through analysis of
Da-sein's authenticity that it becomes ontologically and existentially
definite.
\item
\emph{Falling prey} is Da-sein losing itself in its ``world''.  Public
interpretedness, in the form of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, closes off
what is disclosed and disguises what is discovered.  Beings show themselves,
but as illusions.  Here \emph{Da-sein is in ``untruth'' in accordance with the
constitution of its being}.  These terms are used ontolotgically, with no
ontically negative value judgement.  When the statement ``Da-sein is in the
truth'' is fully developed ontologically it also says ``Da-sein is in
untruth''.  Only insofar as innerworldly beings are discovered already with
Da-sein are they covered over and given the possibility of being encountered.
\end{enumerate}

Discovering a being's truth \emph{robs} it of its concealment, of its
being-in-untruth. We can now say that truth, most primordially, is the
disclosedness of Da-sein, which has the discoveredness of innerworldly beings.
Also, Da-sein is equiprimordially in truth and untruth.

As for the truth of statements, they ar ebased on understanding and the
disclosedness of Da-sein, and so their truth is accordingly based on the
disclosedness of understanding.  Innerworldly beings are discovered through
care, and Da-sein expressed \emph{itself} as discovering.  It does this
expressing in statements, which ``communicate beings in the how of their
discoveredness''.  Statements preserve discoveredness in what is expressed,
which itself becomes an innerworldly thing at hand.  Because of the
preservation, even repetitions bring Da-sein into a being toward the beings
originally discussed, though Da-sein does not repeat the act of discovering.

So discoveredness can be appropriated without ``original'' experience through
hearsay.  In this case, the relation of statement to the beings it discovers is
presented as an objecively present thing relating objectively present things.
This is how the traditional concept of truth as objectively present agreement
of statement to object is brought about.  This is its ontological derivation.

``The statement is not the primary `locus' of truth, but the \emph{other way
around}.''

c: The Kind of Being of Truth and the Presupposition of Truth---Since truth comes out of Da-sein's discoveredness, ``all truth is relative
to the being of Da-sein.'' Da-sein presupposes in being ahead of itself, and so
the truth presupposed has the kind of being of Da-sein.  Discoveredness is
presupposed in Da-sein's project.

Skeptics refute themselves insofar as they \emph{are} at all, and udnerstand
themselves in their being.  Skepticism is refuted out of groundlessness, not
formal dialectic.  The \emph{a priori} is not the eternally true, but the
equiprimordially true and untrue.

Has this shit worked \emph{at all}?  Find out next time!

\section*{Da-sein and Temporality}
\section{The Result of the Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Da-sein and the
ask of a Primordial, Existential Interpretation of This Being}
The being of Da-sein is contained in care.  \emph{Existence} means Da-sein
\emph{is} as an understanding potentiality-of-being, concerned in its being
about its being.  Care helped develop existence's equiprimordial connection
with facticity and falling prey.  But here we have left out authentic
potentiality-of-being, and thus cannot claim that our existential analytic is
primordial.  We need Da-sein as a whole, we must ask the question of its
potentiality-for-being-a-whole.  The potentiality is always outstanding as long
as Da-sein is.  Belonging to the outstanding is the ``end'' itself, death.  In
being a whole, Da-sein is in the mode of being-at-an-end.

How can Da-sein exist as an \emph{authentic} whole?  Conscience?
Wanting-to-have-a-conscience/  Using the word VERY FUCKING CAREFULLY we can see
an authentic potentiality-of-being here, and it's made definite existentielle
by being toward death.

Da-sein comes out of \emph{temporality}, which it encounters through care as
``time''.

Basically we take Da-sein out to being in the horizon of time.  OK, let's do
it!!

\section*{The Possible Being-a-Whole of Da-sein and Being-toward-Death}
\section{The Seeming Impossibility of Ontologically Grasping and Determining
Da-sein as a Whole}
Even when Da-sein has ``settled its accounts'' its being is influenced by
``being ahead of itself''.  Da-sein essentially has in its constitution a
\emph{constant unfinished quality}.  As lon as it is, Da-sein has something
outstanding, so that if it ever achieves ``wholeness'' it loses
being-in-the-world, and is no longer experienced \emph{as a being}.
Ontological wholeness of Da-sein is not even graspable.  We have to
existentially develop the being-toward-the-end of Da-sein and death itself.

\section{The Possibility of Experiencing the Death of Others and the
Possibility of Grasping Da-sein as a Whole}
Da-sein can neither experience nor understand as experienced its own death.
Da-sein can experience another's death through being-with wth others.  What is
experienced is a being's transition from the kind of being of Da-sein to
no-longer-being-there, \emph{ending} being qua Da-sein and \emph{beginning}
being qua objective presence.  Note that it's not merely \emph{lifeless}
material, but an \emph{unliving} thing no longer alive.

But in a funeral we are with someone not factically ``there''.  We can only
\emph{be with him in terms of this world}.  The deceased has left this world,
but we cannot experience that.  ``We are asking about the ontological meaning
of the dying of the person who dies, as a potentiality-of-being of \emph{his
being}, and not about the way of being-with and the still-being-there of the
deceased with those left behind.''

Death is an existential phenomenon.  Going-out-of-the-world of Da-sein is
dying, that of what is only alive is perishing.

\section{What is Outstanding, End, and Totality}
The story so far:

\begin{enumerate}
\item
As long as Da-sein is it has a not-yet, what is constantly outstanding.
\item
``The coming-to-its-end of what is not-yet-at-an-end$\ldots$has the character of
no-longer-being-there.''
\item
Coming-to-an-end is a mode of being in which Da-sein cannot be represented
by another.
\end{enumerate}

What is outstanding?  It ``belongs'' to Da-sein, but lacks.  It's not yet
available.  This not-yet is ``filled out until the sum owed is `all
together.'\,''  Outstandingness means what belongs together isn't.  ``\emph{The
being for which something is outstanding has the kind of being of something at
hand}.''  The together or the untogether based on it, is characterized as a
\emph{sum}.  This can't define the not-yet that is Da-sein's own possible death
since it has the kind of being of something at hand.  The together of Da-sein's
being ``in running its course'' isn't a gradual piecing-on of beings at hand.

``In order to$\ldots$define the \emph{being of the not-yet of the character of
Da-sein}, we must reflect on beings to whose kind of being becoming belongs.''
Unripe fruit \emph{becomes} ripe, it doesn't piece itself together as something
not-yet-objectively-present.  The not-yet of unripeness isn't something
objectively present that sits indifferently with the fruit, but the fruit
itself in a kind of being.  In this way, Da-sein \emph{is always already its
not-yet} as long as it is.

But death is not like ripeness---it does not imply \emph{fulfillment}, or even
an \emph{ending}.  Fulfillment is founded upon ``finishedness'', which is
possible only as adetermination of something objectively present or at hand.
But death is nothing like the end of rain, or of a sandwich.  \emph{Da-sein is
not objectively present or at hand}!

Da-sein already \emph{is} its end.  Da-sein is not always being-at-an-end, but
\emph{being toward the end}.  At birth Da-sein is old enough to die---that is,
as soon as it is Da-sein has death as a possible way to be.

So we haven't tied this together yet in terms of the kind of being of Da-sein.
That means we must follow the phenomenon of care.

\section{How the Existential Analysis of Death Differs from Other Possible
Interpretations of This Phenomenon}
How death is defined in terms of life is always ontically understood, and we
must look at this understanding from the ontology of Da-sein.  Da-ein, as
Da-sein, never simply \emph{perishes}, since it is not ``merely'' alive.  Its
physiological death is its \emph{demise}, which can only happen through
\emph{dying} (being toward death).

``The existential analysis [of death] is methodically prior to the questions of
a biology, psychology theodicy, and theology of death.''  We have to
ontologically characterize the kind of being in which the ``end'' enters
average everydayness.  Now we must ontologically look at Da-sein's
being-\emph{toward}-the-end.

\section{A Preliminary Sketch of the Existential and Ontological Structure of
Death}
Time to define death in terms of the characteristics of its being:

\begin{description}
\item[in being-ahead-of-itself], existence
\item[in already-being-in $\ldots$], facticity
\item[in being-together-with $\ldots$], falling prey
\end{description}

How are the existence, facticity, and falling prey of Da-sein revealed in the
phenomenon of death?  The not-yet was inappropriate, since the most extreme
not-yet has the character of something Da-sein relates \emph{to}.  Death isn't
not yet objectively present, death is an \emph{imminence}.  Other things can be
imminent, from objectively present or at hand beings to Mitda-sein to
possibilities-of-being, but death as the possibility of
no-longer-being-able-to-be-there throws Da-sein back on its ownmost
potentiality of being.  Death makes Da-sein imminent to itself, and all
relations to other Da-sein disappear.  Da-sein cannot evade the possibility of
death.  It is \emph{an eminent imminence}, Da-sein's \emph{ownmost
nonrelational possibility not to be bypassed}.  Being-toward-death is the most
primordial concretion of care, of being-ahead-of-itself.  Death is a
possibility Da-sein is \emph{thrown} into without knowledge, so death belongs
to being-in-the-world.  This thrownness into death reveals itself to Da-sein in
the attunement of \emph{Angst}, \emph{Angst} about death isn't dear of one's
demise but the disclosedness of Da-sein's existence as thrown
being-toward-its-end.  So the existential concept of dying is thrown being
toward the ownmost potentiality-of-being not to be bypassed.  The flight from
being-toward-death makes itself known in the entangled being together with
$\ldots$ of factical existing.  \emph{Ontologically, dying is grounded in care}.
Now we have to show the connection in everydayness.

\section{Being-toward-Death and the Everydayness of Da-sein}
How does the attuned understanding in the idle talk of the they have disclosed
being-toward-death?  Public, everyday being-with-one-another understands death
as a familiar event in the world, keeping it inconspicuous.  The idle talk that
understands it thusly says: ``One also dies at the end, but for now one is not
involved.''  ``One dies'' is clearly of the they, as it makes death something
``all around us'', something happening to the they but never I myself.  Death
is no longer mind, but it ``concerns'' me.  This is ambiguous in the way of
idle talk.

While a person is dying, the others in his they (``neighbors'') try to convince
him he will evade death, making sure of a \emph{constant tranquillization
toward death} for him and for them.  The they also distorts Angst into fear of
a future event, a fear it encourages Da-sein to ignore and forget.

This all has the kind of being of \emph{falling prey}.  Everyday
being-toward-death is a \emph{flight from death}.  ``Being \emph{toward} the
end has the mode of \emph{evading that end}---reinterpreting it, understanding
it inauthentically, and veiling it.''  But all that is lost here is Angst.
Da-sein is still \emph{concerned with} its death.

How does this evasive Da-sein understand its own death?

\section{Everyday Being-toward-Death and the Complete Existential Concept of
Death}
Everydayness ambiguously acknowledges death as both ``certain'' and ``also
sometime, but for the time being not yet.''  What is this certainty?
Certainty is being-certain as a kind of being of Da-sein, and beings Da-sein is
certain of are also ``certain''.  In \emph{conviction}, Da-sein understands the
thing discovered certainly according to its own testimony.  Certainty can keep
Da-sein in truth if it is based on the discovered beings themselves.  The
covering over of death isn't undertainty in the sense of doubting, but in the
sense that is is a certainty inappropriate for holding-for-true.  Inappropriate
certainty covers over that of which it's certain.  The certainty of death as an
event in the surrounding world is inappropriate as a way to get at
being-toward-the-end, so we see how everydayness covers over death and makes it
``certain'' at the same time.

But when \emph{they} say death is certain, Da-sein is under the illusion that
it is \emph{itself} certain of its own death, even if Da-sein is not even
certain of its ownmost nonrelational potentiality-of-being not-to-be-bypassed.
Entangled everyday Da-sein ``knows about the certainty of death, yet avoids
\emph{being}-certain.''  Everydayness also says ``but not yet'', covering over
the fact \emph{that death is possible in every moment}.  Everyday
being-toward-death says the when of death is definite, trying to evate its
\emph{indefiniteness}.  it does not make the when definite by saying wen the
demise will occur but by putting before death in Da-sein's attention ``those
manageable urgencies and possibilities of the everyday matters nearest to us.''
This covering-over of death's indefiniteness also covers over its certainty,
thus covering over the ownmost character of the possibility of death.

So now we can define the full existential and ontological concept of death:

\begin{quote}
As the end of Da-sein, death is the ownmost nonrelational, certain, and, as
such, indefinite and not to be bypassed possibility of Da-sein.
\end{quote}

Da-sein exists toward its death, and this most extreme not-yet is always
already included in Da-sein; ``The phenomenon of the not-yet has been taken
from the ahead-of-itself.''  Now we turn our attention to the ontological
possibility of authentic being-toward-death.

\section{Existential Project of an Authentic Being-toward-Death}
We have established the existential concept of death as well as inauthentic
being-toward-death, so we know that to which authentic being-toward-death
relates as well as that which it is not.  \emph{Authentic} being-toward-death
can \emph{not evade} death.  Being-toward-death is a being \emph{toward a
possibility}, which can mean to be out for something possible, to take care of
its actualization.  Even when a possibility has been actualized it remains
something possible for $\ldots$, it is characterized by an in-order-to.  Being
out for something and taking care of it ``\emph{circum}spectly looks
\emph{away} from the possible to what it is possible for.''  It is different
with death, however, since rather than a possible thing at hand or ojectively
present it is a possibility-of-being of \emph{Da-sein}, and furthermore since
taking care of the actualization of the possibility of death deprives Da-sein
of its ground for existing being-toward-death.

Da-sein relates to what is possible in its possibility by \emph{expecting} it.
This is not just a looking away from what is possible to its possible
actualization but a \emph{waiting for that actualization}.  One expects the
reality of what is expected, and the possible is thus connected to the real in
expecting.

But in being toward death \emph{as possibility}, in \emph{anticipation of this
possibility}, we see that the possibility of death \emph{is as far removed as
possible from anything real}.  The possibility of death is \emph{the
possibility of the impossibility of exitence in general}.  Anticipation,
relating Da-sein to its possibilities as possibilities, shows itself as the
possibility of \emph{authentic existence}.  Thus we must set forth the concrete
structure of anticipation of death, by defining the role of anticipatory
disclosure in understanding oneself in the potentiality-of-being-at-an-end.
Death \emph{individual}izes Da-sein down to itself, not death but its
nonrelational character understood through anticipation.

Da-sein is authentically itself when it projects itself \emph{as}
being-together with things taken care of and concernful being-with $\ldots$ upon
its ownmost potentiality-of-being and not the possibility of the they-self.

Anticipation also does not evade the imminence of death but \emph{frees} itself
\emph{for} it.  This keeps Da-sein from ``falling back behind itself'', or
(Nietzsche) ``becoming too old for its victories''.  It prevents a finite
understanding of Da-sein's existence from occulting the influences of others'
existence-possibilities.  The individualization of death as the nonrelational
possibility not-to-be-bypassed discloses the potentialities-of-being of others,
and anticipation of the possibility not-to-be-bypassed discloses all
possibilities lying before it.  This anticipation thus gives Da-sein the
possibility of existing as a \emph{whole potentiality-of-being}, of taking its
whole in advance in an existentiell way.

Anticipation also does not evade the imminence of death but \emph{frees} itself
\emph{for} it.  This keeps Da-sein from ``falling back behind itself'', or
(Nietzsche) ``becoming too old for its victories''.  It prevents a finite
understanding of Da-sein's existence from occulting the influences of others'
existence-possibilities.  The individualization of death as the nonrelational
possibility not-to-be-bypassed discloses the potentialities-of-being of others,
and anticipation of the possibility not-to-be-bypassed discloses all
possibilities lying before it.  This anticipation thus gives Da-sein the
possibility of existing as a \emph{whole potentiality-of-being}, of taking its
whole in advance in an existentiell way.

Anticipation also does not evade the imminence of death but \emph{frees} itself
\emph{for} it.  This keeps Da-sein from ``falling back behind itself'', or
(Nietzsche) ``becoming too old for its victories''.  It prevents a finite
understanding of Da-sein's existence from occulting the influences of others'
existence-possibilities.  The individualization of death as the nonrelational
possibility not-to-be-bypassed discloses the potentialities-of-being of others,
and anticipation of the possibility not-to-be-bypassed discloses all
possibilities lying before it.  This anticipation thus gives Da-sein the
possibility of existing as a \emph{whole potentiality-of-being}, of taking its
whole in advance in an existentiell way.

How, existentially, is this constant threat disclosed?  ``The attunement which
is able to hold open the constant and absolute threat to itself arising from
the ownmost individualized being of Da-sein is \emph{Angst}.''  \emph{Angst} is
anxious \emph{about} one's potentiality-of-being, disclosing the most extreme
possibility.  Being-toward-death is essentially \emph{Angst}.

Summary:  ``Anticipation reveals to Da-sein its lostness in the they-self, and
brings it face to face with the possibility to be itself primarily unsupported
by concern taking care of things, but to be itself in passionate anxious
\emph{freedom toward death} which is free of the illusions of the they,
factical, and certain of itself.''

We now have the \emph{ontological} possibility of an authentic
potentiality-for-being-a-whole.  We must make an essential connection with that
authentic potentiality-of-being \emph{attested} to.

\section*{The Attestation of Da-sein of an Authentic Potentiality-of-Being, and
Resoluteness}
\section{The Problem of the Attestation of an Authentic Existentiell
Possibility}
We now know the character of what we are looking for, but it's time to look for
it.  We want ``an authentic potentiality-of-being of Da-sein that is attested
by Da-sein itself in its existentiell possibility.''  This is going to be
rooted in the being of Da-sein.  We look toward an authentic
\emph{potentiality-of-being-one's-self}, which ``self'' is a \emph{way of
existing}, the \emph{who of Da-sein}, which for the most part is not \emph{I
myself} but the they-self.  Authentic being-a-self is an existentiell
modification of the they.  In being lost in the they, Da-sein's choices are
silently made for it, and not by any definite ``who''.  In this mode, when
choices are made for it by no one in particular, Da-sein is caught up in
inauthenticity.  This is reversed by an existentiell modification whereby
Da-sein \emph{chooses to make this choice}, makes possible Da-sein's authentic
potentiality-of-being.  First Da-sein must \emph{find} itself to get out of
lostness in the they, it must be ``shown'' to itself in its possible
authenticity, a potentiality-for-being-its-self which Da-sein already \emph{is}
but has not yet had attested to it.  What does this attesting is the
``\emph{voice of conscience}'', a phenomenon we shall investigate existentially
and with the aim of fundamental ontology.  Careful!  This is not psychology,
biology, theology, or any such dissolution of the phenomenon.  This will be
\emph{hyped}.  Conscience is a \emph{call} which \emph{summons} Da-sein to its
ownmost potentiality-of-being-a-self, by summoning it to its ownmost quality of
being a lack.

\section{The Existential and Ontological Foundations of Conscience}
Conscience ``gives one to understand something''.  Da-sein is summoned by a
call that calls silently, unambiguously, and with no foothold for curiosity.
In other words, the call is the hearing that summons Da-sein from the
\emph{listening} to the they, and its character is in every way opposite such
hearing.  The call interrrupts, summoning Da-sein from idle talk.  This calling
is a mode of discourse.

\section{The Character of Conscience as a Call}
Discourse draws from what is talked about and makes it accessible to the
\emph{Mit}da-sein of others.  What is talked about in the call of conscience,
what is summoned?  The they-self is summoned to the self, not to close itself
off from the ``external world'' but to summon the self which is simply
being-in-the-world.  But what is \emph{what is spoken} here?  Conscience has
nothing to tell and does not ``converse with itself'' in the self summoned.

\emph{Conscience speaks solely and constantly in the mode of silence}.

What the call discloses is unequivocal, even though it is interpreted
differently in individual Da-sein according to its possibilities of being
understood.  The content of the call is ``seemingly indefinite'' but its
direction is sure.  The call is only ``deceptive'' when it is not understood
authentically and is instead drawn by the they-self into conversation with
one's self, distorting it in its character of disclosure.  Conscience as call
is a summons to the they-self in its self.  It is thus a summons of the self to
its potentiality-of-being-a-self, calling Da-sein forth to its possibilities.

\section{Conscience as the Call of Care}
``Conscience calls the self of Da-sein forth from its lostness in the
they.$\ldots$The call passes over \emph{what} Da-sein understands \emph{as}
initially and for the most part in its interpretation in terms of taking care
of things.''  The caller of the call is never familiar, considered, or talked
with or about.  The call comes \emph{from} Da-sein, \emph{over} Da-sein.  It is
something totally unexpected that we are unprepared for.  We need to ``hold
on'' to the notion of conscience as a phenomenon of Da-sein, so that
\emph{this} being is the only way to interpret the kind of being of the ``it''
that calls.  Da-sein flees from uncanniness and thrownness to attunement and
the they-self.

The conscience is Da-sein, calling out from uncanniness.  The voice is alien to
the they-self, definable by \emph{nothing} ``worldly''.  ``It calls, and yet
gives the heedfully curious ears nothing to hear that could be passed along and
publicly spoken about.''  This call individualizes Da-sein to itself in its
uncanniness, making possible for Da-sein its project upon its ownmost
potentiality-of-being.

\emph{Conscience is the call of care}: Da-sein calls, anxious in thrownness
about its potentiality-of-being, summoning Da-sein (itself), calling it forth
to its ownmost potentiality-of-being.  What the summons calls forth is Da-sein,
out of falling prey to the they.  Conscience has its ontological possibility in
the fact that Da-sein is care in the ground of its being.  Conscience is at
bottom always \emph{mine}.

We have it now \emph{as a phenomenon of Da-sein}, but we still need it as
\emph{an attestation} in Da-sein of its ownmost potentiality-of-being.  For
this we must examing the \emph{hearing} that goes along \emph{with} the call.
Then we can fins \emph{what the call gives to understand}.  There is also this
curious connection with ``guilt'' to be explored.

\section{Understanding the Summons, and Guilt}
Guilt.  We all hear it, are called ``guilty'', but what is its primordial,
existential meaning and how did that get distorted by everyday interpretation?

Guilt in the sense of ``owing something'' is related to \emph{things that can
be taken care of}.  This and ``\emph{being responsible for} $\ldots$'' are
``\emph{making oneself responsible}'', by breaking a law.  This can have the
character of ``\emph{becoming responsible to others}'', and blah blah blah none
of this is what we are after.  Being resopnsible to others is \emph{being the
ground} for a lack in another's Da-sein, a being-the-ground which is
``lacking'' in terms of that for which it is the ground.  A \emph{lack} is the
not-being-objectively-present of something which ought to be and can be,
according to taking care of things and the law.  This is bound up with
objective presence, so we must remove the idea of guilt from it.

While the idea of ``guilty'' is distanced from \emph{lacking}, it still bears
the quality of the \emph{not}.  So we may define our ``formal existential idea
of `guilty' as being-the-ground for a being which is determined by a not---that
is, \emph{being-the-ground of a nullity}.''  A lack is not a deficiency of a
``cause''---``\emph{indebtedness is possible only `on the basis' of a
primordial being guilty}.''

The being of Da-sein, care, includes facticity (thrownness), existence
(project), and falling prey.  Da-sein exists as thrown, and so can't get away
from its thrownness.  This is not due to contingency, some``thrownness'' that
occurred as an event, but because \emph{Da-sein is} its ``that'' as care.
Da-sein did not lay the ground of its potentiality-of-being in which it rests.
Da-sein projects itself upon the possibilities into which it is thrown, taking
over being the ground in existing despite the fact that it can \emph{never}
overpower the ground.  ``Being its own thrown ground is the
potentiality-of-being about which care is concerned.''  As it is its ground,
Da-sein \emph{is} a nullity of itself.

When Da-sein stands in one possibility or another it is constantly \emph{not}
other possibilities.  The project is thus essentially \emph{null} in the sense
belonging to Da-sein's freedom for its existentiell possibilities.  Care is so
thoroughly permeated with nullity, is the ground of nullity, that we can say
\emph{Da-sein as such is guilty}.

The call of conscience is a summoning to being-guilty, a calling forth to the
potentiality-of-being that I always already am as Da-sein.

The call calls Da-sein to listen to its ownmost possibility of existence---to
choose itself.  ``\emph{Understanding the summons} means: \emph{wanting to have
a conscience}.''

God DAMN I hope none of this ends up mattering.

So the ``lack'' of ``guilt'' in terms of objective presence turns into the
potentiality-of-being that grounds Da-sein and yet which Da-sein can never be,
it is the nullity of the project, of all the possibilities relinquished in the
standing in \emph{this} possibility.

\section{The Existential Interpretation of Conscience and the Vulgar
Interpretation of Conscience}
Remember that even the vulgar interpretation of conscience is in touch with the
phenomeon pre-ontologically.  It's not outright ``wrong'', but simply keeping
to what \emph{they} know as conscience.  This vulgar interpretation must thus
be accessible from the ontological interpretation, so we must cover these four
departures, where the vulgar interpretation disagrees with the idea of
conscience as the summons of care to being-guilty:

\begin{enumerate}
\item
Conscience has an essentially critical function.
\item
Conscience always speaks relative to a definite deed that's been done or
wished for.
\item
Experientially, the ``voice'' is never so radically related to the being of
Da-sein.
\item
What of ``good'' and ``evil''?  Doesn't conscience ``reprove'' and ``warn''?
\end{enumerate}

Conscience is primarily ``bad'', letting us know that ``guilty'' gets
experienced first.  This turns up \emph{after} the realization or abandonment
of the possibility of the deed.  By calling back into thrownness, bad
conscience points forward.

``\emph{The order of succession in which experiences run their course is not
valid for the phenomenal structure of existing}.''

``Good'' conscience is interpreted as a privation of ``bad'' conscience,as a
making certain that Da-sein ``didn't do it'' and \emph{therefore} is innocent.
The ``certainty'' tranquilizes the desire to have a conscience, to understand
one's being-guilty.  This is bogus.  ``Good'' conscience is neither an
independent nor a founded form of conscience---it is not a phenomenon of
conscience at all.  Here we can also distinguish between a forward-looking,
warning conscience and a backward-looking, reprovig conscience.  Both of these,
however, are still there to deter Da-sein from a willed deed, and not in fact
to summon at all.

The third complaint says that Da-sein's everyday experience \emph{isn't
familiar with} being summoned to be guilty.  Still, vulgar conscience lacks
ontological grounding, instead presupposing a moral \emph{law}.  This sees
Da-sein as a being to be taken care of.  The scope of eveyday conscience is
inadequate for being the sole court for the interpretation of conscience.

So complaint two kind of falls apart here---while the call is frequently
experienced as relating to objectively present ``facts'', this understanding is
restrictive and inadequate.

Complaint one speaks to an expectation that conscience will tell us what to do
with a certainty of outcome.  This would rob existence of the \emph{possibility
of acting}.  The call is never ``positive'' or ``negative'' as \emph{something
to be taken care of}, since it concerns \emph{existence}.

Anyway...

\section{The Existential Structure of the Authentic Potentiality-of-Being
Attested in Conscience}
In understanding the call of conscience, in wanting to have a conscience,
Da-sein is brough face to face with its uncanniness.  Da-sein is ready for
\emph{Angst}.  Recall how we said that in order to be silent one must first
``hav something to say''.  It's this mode of discourse, \emph{reticence}, in
which the call brings the self back from the they's idle chatter and common
sense.  Uncanniness is soundless, and the call coming out of this reticence
calls Da-sein back to the stillness of itself.  The call is clearly not
objectively present, but that does not mean it's not there to be heard.

The ``eminent, authentic disclosedness'' here attested, the ``\emph{reticent
projecting oneself upon one's ownmost beig-guilty which is ready for
\emph{Angst}}'', we shall call \emph{resoluteness}.  Disclosedness is
\emph{primordial truth} which does not refer to ``judgement'' but to a
fundamental existential.  In resoluteness we see Da-sein in this existential,
the truth which is most primordial because it is \emph{authentic}.

It's important to recall the nature of Da-sein as being-in-the-world so that
\emph{authentic being a self} is not misunderstood as a seclusion from the
world.  Resoluteness as authentic disclosedness is \emph{authentically
being-in-the-world}, bringing the self into its being together with things at
hand and taking care of them.  Resolute Da-sein frees itself for its world,
letting others with it ``be'' in their ownmost potentiality-of-being and
disclosing the potentiality in concern which leaps ahead and frees.  From this
arises authentic being-with-one-another.

Da-sein is always already in irresoluteness, it is summoned out of being lost
in the they by resoluteness, which concerns Da-sein with its
potentiality-of-being.  ``Resolution$\ldots$first discovers what is factically
possible in such a wy that it grasps it as it is possible as one's ownmost
potentiality-of-being in the they.''

The spatiality of the there is grounded in disclosedness, and \emph{situation}
is likewise grounded in resoluteness.  ``Situation is the there disclosed in
resoluteness''.  The call of conscience summons us to our
potentiality-of-being, \emph{calls forth to the situation}.  ``Resolute,
Da-sein is already \emph{acting}.''

Oy...

\section*{The Authentic Potentiality-for-Being-a-Whole of Da-sein, and
Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care}
\section{Preliminary Sketch of the Methodical Step from Outlining the Authentic
Being-a-Whole of Da-sein to the Phenomenal Exposition of Temporality}
Authentic being-toward-death is \emph{anticipation}, and authentic
potentiality-of-being is \emph{resoluteness}.  The only way to bring the
concepts together is to project resoluteness upon the most extreme
possibility---to see if resoluteness points to \emph{anticipatory resoluteness}
as its ownmost authentic possibility.

To tackle this we must reconsider Da-sein, clarifying the phenomenon of care by
figuring the role of ``self'' as neither substance nor subject in ``the existng
self whose being was conceived s care''.  This leads to the exposition of
temporality, which \emph{temporalizes} itself in various possibilities of
existence and which plays a role in anticipatory resoluteness.

We'll do our usual bit to distinguish temporality from the vulgar ``time''.
Okay, let's do it.

\section{The Existentielly Authentic Potentiality-for-Being-a-Whole of Da-sein
as Anticipatory Resoluteness}
s anticipatory resoluteness a new phenomenon or is it an \emph{existentiell
modalization} of resoluteness through being-toward-death?  Resoluteness is
reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost being-guilty, also demanding
\emph{Angst} of oneself.  This being-guilty means a null \emph{being} the
ground of a nullity.  This is not quanitifiable or intermittent, but
\emph{constant}.  Only if resoluteness is transparent enough to understand it
as such can ``guilt'' occur authentically in resoluteness.  Resoluteness
develops authentically as anticipation of death, or
\emph{being-toward-the-end-that-understands}.  Resoluteness and anticipation
are not merely ``connected'' but intertwined: \emph{resoluteness has authentic
being-toward-death as the possible existentiell modality of its own
authenticity}.

The being of Da-sein is primarily potentiality-of-being.  because being-guilty
belongs to the being of Da-sein, ``guilty \emph{is} always only the actual
factical potentiality-of-being.''  Being-guilty must thus be conceived as a
potentiality-for-being-guilty.  Resoluteness understands itself in this
potentiality-of-being, staying in a primordial possibility of Da-sein.  It does
so \emph{authentically} only when it ``is primordially what it tends to be.''
This is being-toward-death, anticipation.  ``Resoluteness becomes a primordial
being toward the ownmost potentiality-of-being of Da-sein only \emph{as
anticipatory}.''  Anticipatory resoluteness is the only way to understand the
potentiality-for-being-guilty \emph{authentically} and \emph{wholly}, i.e.:
\emph{primordially}.

Anticipation of death is disclosed as the \emph{nonrelational} possibility.
This bypasses ``worldly'' status.  Wanting-to-have-a-conscience signifies
readiness for the summons to one's ownmost being-guilty that always already
determined factical Da-sein \emph{before} and \emph{after} any factical
indebtedness.

In its death, Da-sein must ``take itself back''.  \emph{Anticipating}, i.e.:
constantly \emph{being-certain} of this, resoluteness is authentically and
wholly certain.  It must look to itself \emph{prior to} relatedness in order to
look to the possibility of nonexistence.  Resoluteness looks to the
\emph{whole} potentiality-of-being of Da-sein.  But even in this mode Da-sein
\emph{holds} itself open for the irresoluteness of the they.  Resoluteness is
forced to look to its potentiality-of-being with regard to the actual
situation.  The indefiniteness of death discloses itself primordially in
\emph{Angst}, an attunement that strives for resoluteness.  We can no longer
conceive of anticipation as hypothetical and unattached behavior.  Anticipation
is ``\emph{the possibility of the authenticity of that resoluteness
existentielly attested to in such resoluteness---a possibility concealed and
thus also attested}.''

So basically anticipatory resoluteness is a mode of being in which Da-sein is
aware of its possibilities and how they all lead to death, specifically in a
way that is not concerned with the details with the they's everyday,
commonsense interpretation.

\section{The Hermeneutical Situation at Which We Have Arrived for Interpreting
the Meaning of Being of Care, and the Methodical Character of the Existential
Analytic in General}
We have now defined Da-sein well enough in its ontological peculiarities, with
enough primordiality, that we can properly interpret the meaning of the being
of care.  We have thus far shown how the commonsense way of taking care of
things has taken over and closed off Da-sein's potentiality-of-being.

The kind of being of Da-sein therefore needs any ontological interpretation to
``\emph{be in charge of the being of this being in spite of this being's own
tendency to cover things over}.''  In circumspect taking care of things, one
circumspectly heeds taking care of things as well.  In existing and
understanding, Da-sein somehow (appropriately or not) understands its own
existence as well.  In this way every ontological question Da-sein asks about
being is made ready by the kind of being of Da-sein.

Now we confront our ``circularity''.  Does Da-sein' interpretation of its
existence inherit its guidelines from a ``presupposed'' idea of existence?
This ``circle'' we are so well trained to avoid is in fact the basic structure
of care!  Da-sein has always already projected itself upon its possibilities,
and in these projects it also has pre-ontologically projected ``something like
existence and being.''

But common sense only takes care of ``factual'' beings, beings in view of its
circumspection.  It ignores and fails to understand that ``factual''
experience comes after and along with understanding of being.  Common sense
brands anything outside its understanding of being.  Common sense brands
anything outside its understanding as ``violent'' because it misunderstands
understanding.  The being of Da-sein is circular, so rather than reducing it to
a problem of an ``I'' and an object, we must leap into the ``circle''
primordially, letting ourselves proceed with a complete view of Da-sein's
circular being.  Now to tackle care!

\section{Care and Selfhood}
To clarify care we must show it as Da-sein turns to itself in care.  This begs
a proper ontological examination of selfhood.

The everyday \emph{self-interpretation} of Da-sein expresses ``itself'' in
\emph{saying-I}.  This simple declaration refers to \emph{nothing but me}, an
absolute ``subject''.  This is a single persistent thing to which Kant gave the
characteristics ``simplicity'', ``substantiality'', and ``personality''. Time
to find out where this comes from.

Kant pegs the phenomenal content of the ``I'' as ``I think'', which is not
something represented but rather ``the formal structure of representing as
such'', making possible all representations.  This ties the I into an
objectively present subject, leading back to the \emph{res cogitans}.  Kant's
empiricism holds him back from the phenomenological understanding of ``I
think'' as ``I think something''.  Though he recognizes the dependency of the I
upon its representations, he fails to discuss their connection (which is
what's actually there!).

In clarifying the ``something'', we find it must be \emph{innerworldly}, which
implies a \emph{world}.  This shifts the I to an ``I-am-in-a-world''.  Everyday
saying-I does not see itself in relation to its own kind of being, but rather
tends to understand itself in terms of the ``world'' taken care of.

Selfhood can only be found existentially in authentic
potentiality-of-being-a-self, in authentic Da-sein \emph{as care}.  Now we can
understand, in terms of care, the \emph{constancy of the self} as its having
gained a stand.  ``Existentially, the \emph{constancy of the self} means
nothing other than anticipatory resoluteness.''  In reticence, Da-sein
``\emph{is}'' rather than repeatedly saying ``I''.

Now, temporality.

\section{Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care}
``\emph{Meaning} signifies$\ldots$that in terms of which something can be conceived
in its possibility as what it3is.  Projecting discloses$\ldots$what makes something
possible.'' To set forth the meaning of care is to pursue the project guiding
Da-sein's existential interpretation so tha its upon-which is made visible in
what is projected.

``Meaning signifies the upon-which of the primary project of the understanding
of being.'' That is, meaning is at the root of the understanding of being.  For
a thing to ``have meaning'' is for it to have become accessible \emph{in its
being}.  It ``has'' meaning because it becomes intelligible in the project of
that being.

``The primary project of the understanding of being `gives' meaning.''

Anticipatory resoluteness is the \emph{being toward} one's ownmost, eminent
potentiality-of-being.  This is possible as Da-sein is able to come toward
itself in its ownmost possibility.  \emph{Letting-come-toward-itself} that
``perdures the eminent possibility'' is the primordial phenomenon of the
\emph{future}.  This ``future'' isn't what is ``not yet actual'', but is how
Da-sein comes toward itself in its ownmost potentiality-of-being.  Since
anticipation makes Da-sein \emph{authentically} futural, anticipation is
possible only in how Da-sein always already comes toward itself---Da-sein is
futural in its being in general.

Da-sein \emph{is} as I-am-having-been.  ``Authentically futural, Da-sein is
authentically \emph{having-been}.''  Letting what is at hand be encountered in
action can only happen in a ``\emph{making} that being \emph{present}.''  The
present is released from the future that is in the process of having-been.  We
cann the unified phenomenon of this process \emph{temporality}, and it is the
meaning of authentic care, given this idea of making present.

So now we get to demonstrate how the vulgar, derivative concept of time arose
from primordial and authentic temporality, which requires a concrete
description of the latter phenomenon.

Temporality is where the primordial unity of the structure of care is.
``Ahead-of-itself-already-in-a-world.'' The \emph{ahead} and \emph{already}
express temporality, but clearly not in the vulgar sense.  ``Ahead'' is the
future that first makes possible Da-sein's ability to be concerned \emph{about}
its potentiality-of-being.  ``Already'' is \emph{already having-been}, meaning
``I-\emph{am}-as-having-been.''  Da-sein, in \emph{attunement}, finds that it
is what it still is and already was.

But there's another part to care: entangled being-together-with-$\ldots$.
\emph{Making present} is the primary basis of \emph{falling prey} to things at
hand and objectively present.  It is \emph{included} in the future and in
having-been, via primordial temporality.

``Future, having-been, and present show the phenomenal characteristics of
`toward itself', `back to', `letting something be encountered'.''  These reveal
temporality as the ``ekstatikon par excellence'', the primordial ``outside
of itself'' in and for itself.  The phenomena of future, having-been, and
present are the \emph{ecstasies} of temporality.  Temporality temporalizes in
these ecstasies' \emph{utility}, not through their cumulative sequence.
Nevertheless, the future has priority in this unity.  Authentic future,
futurally having-been, arouses the present.  Primordial temporality is thus
\emph{finite}, since it is related to anticipatory resoluteness.  Primordial
and athentic futuer is toward \emph{oneself}, and says nothing of anything once
no longer here.  Inauthentic temporality temporalizes an infinite time out of
finite time.

Now we have to relate this more concretely to Da-sein.

\section{The Temporality of Da-sein and the Tasks Arising from It of a More
Primordial Retrieve of the Existential Analysis}
Time to reveal the temporal meaning of \emph{everydayness}.  ``Temporality
reveals itself as the \emph{historicity} of Da-sein.''  In circumspect taking
care of things, Da-sein \emph{expends itself}, ``uses itself up''.  Da-sein
uses its time, reckoning with it.

Circumspect and reckoning taking care of things discovers time and builds a
measurement.  Circumspect care lets what is at hand and objectively present be
encountered in time, giving them a ``\emph{within-time-ness}''.  The vulgar and
traditional concept of time arises from this, and thus is grounded in and
arises from primordial temporality.  We have elaborated Da-sein's temporality
as everydayness, historicity, and within-time-ness.  This should demonstrate
the importance of clarifying beings unlike Da-sein for the ontological
problematic.  Everyday temporality will need much more clarification than this.

\section*{Temporality and Everydayness}
\section{The basic Content of the Existential Constitution of Da-sein, and the
Preliminary Sketch of Its Temporal Interpretation}
Primordial constitution of Da-sein is not a reduction to some ``ultimate
structural element''.  Things ``arise'' in ontology by means of degeneration,
not revealing something ontically self-evident by ``common understanding'' but
instead calling all self-evidence into question.

Blah blah I'm pretty sure this is recap but we'll see.

\section{The Temporality of Disclosedness in General}
The individual structural moments of care ar eunderstanding, attunement,
entanglement, and discourse.  To temporally interpret these moments is to
demonstrate the concrete temporal constitution of care.  Okay, so...

``Every understanding has its mood.  Every attunement understands.  Attuned
understanding has the characteristic of entanglement.  Entangled, attuned
understanding articulates itself with regard to its intelligibility in
discourse.''  Looking at these we can reconstruct the ``\emph{one} temporality
that holds within itself the possible structural unity of'' these.

a. The Temporality of Understanding---
The primordial and existential meaning of understanding: ``\emph{to be
projecting toward a potentiality-of-being for the sake of which Da-sein always
exists}.''

Understanding is the basis upon which Da-sein can develop the possibilities of
sight, looking around, looking.  Da-sein's potentiality-of-being is disclosed
to itself such that it knows its situation, what's going on with itself in
terms of existentiell possibility.  Understanding oneself projectively happens
because of the future: it is a coming-toward-oneself from the possibility as
which Da-sein always exists.  ``Understandingly, Da-sein always \emph{is} as it
can be.''

Temporality does not constantly temporalize itself out of authentic future, so
the temporalizing of the future is changeable.

\emph{Anticipation} is still the term to use because the future arises not from
the present but from the inauthentic future.  Da-sein is always factically
ahead-of-itself, but inconstantly anticipatory.  In the mode of inauthentic
future Da-sein does not anticipate but instead it \emph{awaits} its ownmost,
nonrelational potentiality-of-being ``heedfully \emph{in terms of that which
what is taken care of produces or denies}.''  Heedful expectation is founded in
awaiting and temporalizes itself authentically as anticipation.

In resoluteness, the present isn't just acquierd from the ``dispersion in what
is taken care of'' and kept, but is ``held in the future and having-been.''
This authentic present is called the \emph{Moment}.  This phenomenon does
\emph{not} reduce to the \emph{now}.  ``In the Moment'' nothing happens, but
there we can \emph{encounter for the first time} what can be ``in a time'' as
objectively present.

Contrasting the authentic Moment is the inauthentic present, called
\emph{making present}.  Even authenticpresent makes present, but inauthentic
present merely does so; it is not ``in the Moment''.  ``[I]nauthentic
understanding projects its potentiality-of-being in terms of what can be taken
care of,$\ldots$ it temporalizes itself in terms of making present.  The Moment, on
the other hand, tmproalizes itself out of the authentic future.''

``In anticipation, Da-sein \emph{brings} itself \emph{forth again} to its
ownmost potentiality-of-being.  We call authentic having-\emph{been}
\emph{retrieve}.''  Inauthentic projecting is based on Da-sein having
\emph{forgotten} itself in its ownmost, \emph{thrown} potentiality-of-being.
This forgetting is not failure to remember, but a ``\,`positive', ecstatic mode
of having-been''.  On the basis of this forgetting mere making present
\emph{retains} things, beings unlike Da-sein encountered in the world.

Just as awaiting makes possible expectation, forgetting makes possible
\emph{remembering}, \emph{and not the other way around}.

``Although inauthentic heedful understanding is determined in the light of
making present what is taken care of, the temporalizing of understanding comes
about primarily in the future.''

b. The Temporality of Attunement---
Understanding is always attuned.  Attunement brings Da-sein \emph{before} its
thrownness, disclosing it in ``how one is''.  \emph{Being} thrown,
existentially, is to find oneself in such and such a way.  Understanding is
primarily grounded in the future, but \emph{attunement} temporalizes itself
\emph{primarily} in having-been.

Ontically, moods come and go, running their courses ``in time'', but we need to
explore the existential and temporal constitution of mood, which is that it is
a ``\emph{bringing back to} $\ldots$''.  We must show that moods can only
``signify'' existentielly \emph{on the basis of temporality}.  Now, the
temporality of \emph{fear}:

Fear is inauthentic attunement, fear of something innerworldly, a circumspect
``letting something-come-toward-oneself''.  Doesn't this primarily have to do
with the future?  Fear is futural, and ``related'' to ``something futural'',
but is not possible on the basis of this alone.  ``[T]he awaiting that fears is
afraid `for itself',$\ldots$ fear of is a fearing \emph{about}.''  Fear confuses,
causing one to forget and back away from a factical, resolute
potentiality-of-being into ``those possibilities of self-preservation and
evasion that have already been circumspectly discovered beforehand.''

How about \emph{Angst}?  Angst brings Da-sein before its thrownness and the
uncanniness of everyday, familiar being-in-the-world.  The ``threat'' revealed
in Angst is that everything at hand and objectively present has nothing to
``say'' to us.  One has \emph{Angst} in the face of Da-sein itself.  In
\emph{Angst} one cannot project oneself upon a potentiality-of-being based on
what is taken care of.  \emph{Angst} is anxious about Fa-sein's thrownness into
uncanniness, bringing one back to the pure That of this ownmost thrownness.
This bringing back to thrownness is as something to be \emph{possible
retrieved}.  This reveals the possibility of authentic potentiality-of-being
that, as something futural in retrieving, comes back to thrown There.  So the
attunement of having-been that constitutes \emph{Angst} has the specific
ecstatic mode of \emph{bringing before the possibility of retrieval}.  Both
modes of attunement, \emph{Angst} and fear, are primarily grounded in
\emph{having-been}, but ``\emph{Angst} arises from the \emph{future} of
resoluteness, while fear arises from the lost present of which fear is
fearfully apprehensive,$\ldots$''.  Even hope, seemingly futural, is grounded in
having-been in that it \emph{brings relief} from a burden.  Ontologically, only
attuned beings can be affected, such that in making present Da-sein can be
brought back to itself as having-been.  How \emph{stimulation} and
\emph{touching} of senses in the merely alive are to be ontologically defined
is another problem.

c. The Temporality of Falling Prey---
The future primarily makes understanding possible, having-been makes mood
possible, and the present makes falling prey possible.  We interpreted falling
prey before as idle chatter, curiosity, and ambiguity.  We can most easily see
falling prey's temporality in curiosity, so we'll focus on that.

\emph{Curiosity} is a tendency by which Da-sein takes care of potentiality of
seeing.  This seeing, really a broader perceiving, lets what is at hand and
objectively present be ``bodily'' encountered with regard to outward
appearance.  This is grounded in a present.  This present gives the ecstatic
horizon by which beings can be bodily \emph{present}.  Criosity does not make
present to \emph{understand}, but to see and have seen.  This greed for the new
attempts to withdraw from awaiting.  Thus inauthentically futural, curiosity
does not await \emph{possibility} but instead ``desires possibility as
something real.''

This making present, awaiting definite, grasped possibility, makes possible
ontologically curiosity's \emph{not-staying}.  Awaiting is ecstatically
modified into ``arising'', \emph{pursuing} making present.

When awaiting is thus modified ecstatically by pursuit, that modification is
``the existential and temporal condition of the possibility of
\emph{dispersion}.''

Making present thus modified ``makes present for the sake of the present.''
Dispersed not-staying becomes \emph{the inability to stay at all}.  ``\emph{The
Moment} brings existence to the situation and discloses the authentic
`There'.''  In constrast, this present does the opposite.  It is an
\emph{inability} by which Da-sein ``is everywhere and nowhere.''

ne forgets as the present ``arises''.  Curiosity has forgotten what went before
and keeps to what is nearest by.  This fact is the ontological condition for
curiosity, not just a result \emph{from} curiosity.

Da-sein, awaiting and forgetting, still is temporal in that it understands
itself, albeit alienated from its ownmost potentiality-of-being grounded in
authentic future and having-been.  Curiosity, offering something ``new'', does
not let Da-sein come back to itself.  Curiosity is not ``brought about'' by
``the endless immensity of what has not yet been seen'' but by the entanglement
of the arising present.

The present arises from a fleeing from thrown being-toward-death, letting
Da-sein come to authentic existence only by taking a detour through the
present.  The origin of entanglement is ``the primordial, authentic temporality
itself that makes possible thrown being-toward-death.''

Da-sein is swept along in thrownness.  The present, existentially constituting
being swept along, cannot move beyond itself into another ecstatic horizon
unless brought back by resoluteness such that the actual situation and the
``boundary situation'' of being-toward-death are brought together as the held
Moment.

d. The Temporality of Discourse---
We cannot show the tmeproality of discourse until the fundamental connection
between being and truth has been unfolded in the temporal problematic.  Then we
can find the ontological meaning of the ``is''.

Understanding is grounded in the future (anticipation, awaiting), yet is always
a present that ``has-been''.  Attunement temporalizes itself primarily in
having-been (retrieve, forgottenness), yet also as a future that ``makes
present''.  Falling prey is temporally rooted primarily in the present (making
present, the Moment), yet ``arises'' from a future that has-been.  The unity of
the structure of care is thus grounded in the exstatic unity of the
temporalizing of temporality.  A future that makes present, in the process of
having-been.  Now we must show the ontological possibility of
being-in-the-world.

\section{The Temporality of Being-in-the-World and the Problem of the
Transcendence of the World}
``The ecstatic unity of temporality$\ldots$is the confition of the possibility that
there can be a being that exists as its `There'.''  This is the clearing of
Da-sein, clearedness arising from care.  Before any ``temporal''
interpretation, care ``opens'' and makes Da-sein ``bright'' for itself.  All
the essential existential structures of Da-sein are regulated and unified by
ecstatic temporality.

We have traced the origins of \emph{care} to temporality, but it is now time to
explicitly conceive \emph{taking care} in terms of temporality.

We face the question: how is something like world possible?  In what sense
\emph{is} world?  What and how does it transcend, and how ar einnerworldly
beings ``connected'' with the surrounding world?  We'll do this in three parts:
tmeporality of circumspect taking care, the modification of this into
theoretical knowledge of objectively present innerworldly things, and
transcendence of the world.

a. The Temporality of Circumspect Taking Care---
Heedful being together with the ``world'' is our association in and with the
surrounding world, conceived earlier as being together with things that belong
to everyday need.  Taking care and things taken care of aren't just objectively
present together, but their connection is informative.  What i taken care of
can shed light on taking care.  The kind of being of useful things at hand is
\emph{relevance}.  That relevance is relational highlights that there is no
such thing, ontologically, as \emph{a} useful thing.  Taking care that
circumspectly discovers is letting something be in relevance.  Letting things
be relevant is taking care, which belongs to the essential constitution of
care, which is grounded in temporality.

Thus, the possibility of taking care must be sought in temporalized
temporality.  ``Understanding the intention and context of relevance has the
temporal structure of awaiting.''  The context is \emph{awaited} and the
relevance is \emph{retained}, making possible the handy way in which a
particular useful thing is made present.  Being relevant constitutes itself in
this way such that it makes absorption in taking care of a world possible.
Useful things are not encountered through perception but in inconspicuousness.

The conspicuousness of, say, a broken took can not be discovered by
``representation'', since it can be conspicuous only in and for the user.  This
damage ``holds up'' the making present that awaits and retains, shifting it
more to itself as it works to inspect and remove the disturbance.

The disclosure of obstcles on the basis of the ecstatic temporality of taking
care allows Da-sein to ``understand itself in its abandonment to a `world' of
which it never becomes master.''  Da-sein exists in a world because of a
retention that awaits, which is why it in a way always already knows its way
around even a strange ``world''.

Now we're going to demonstrate how theoretical behavior to the ``world'' comes
out of circumspect taking care.

b. The Temporal Meaning of the Way in which Circumspect Taking Care Becomes
Modified into the Theoretical Discovery of Things Objectively Present in the
World---
How does \emph{theoretical} discovery ``arise'' from \emph{circumspect} taking
care?  This is not about denying ``the \emph{ontic} history and development of
science, or of its factical occasions or of its nearest goals'', but searching
for the \emph{ontological genesis} of theoretical behavior.  What makes this
mode of behavior possible?  We seek not a ``logical'' conception of science
(``a `context of causal relations of true, that is, valid propositions'\,''), but
an \emph{existential concept of science} as a mode of existence, a mode of
being-in-the-world ``which discovers or discloses beings or being.''

Science's goal of pure observation seems at first to imply that taking care
\emph{astains} from use.  But it is not simply a \emph{privation}, the
\emph{absence} of praxis.  This is just-looking-around, not a ``theoretical''
attitude.  Scientific behavior is in no way a ``purely intellectual activity'',
but is regulated by ``seeing''.  We thus have to characterize the
circumspection of the ``practical'' mode.  There is a potentiality-of-being of
Da-sein \emph{for the sake of which} taking care exists as care.  This
potentiality-of-being illuminates the overview, the primary understanding of
the totality of relevance.  Circumspection brings things \emph{nearer} to
Da-sein by using in the mode of interpretation.  We call this bringing near
\emph{deliberation}.  This works as an ``if-then''.  Bringing near in
circumspect deliberation does not simply ``confirm'' a being's objective
presence; it has the existential meaning of \emph{making present}.

In \emph{awaiting} a possibility, Da-sein takes care of useful things.
Circumspect making present is grounded in a \emph{retention} of the context of
these useful things.  Da-sein, awaiting a possibility (what-for), retains a
thing at hand (for-this).  \emph{Conversely} can the making present belonging
to awaiting retention \emph{bring} it \emph{explicitly nearer} in reference to
the what-for.  The deliberation that brings near must adapt to the kind of
being of what is brought near.

The grounding of the present in the future and the having-been makes possible
bringing near in a making present such that the present adapts itself to what
is encountered, interpreting itself in the schema of the as-structure.  The
``as'' is grounded in the unity of temporality.

The theoretical mode removes an object from deliberation.  A hammer that is too
heavy is now just ``heavy'', describing a ``property'' of its ``mass''.  The
hammer is no longer a tool and is now only a corporeal thing.  It no longer
provides us with a relation that can produce ``too heavy''.

Switching to looking at the hammer as objectively presen, \emph{the
understanding of being} guiding heedful association \emph{has been
transformed}.  This \emph{overlooks} the place of the useful thing, turning it
into a ``location'', ``world point''---a position in space and time.
``Objectifying being together with things objectively present has the character
of an \emph{eminent making present}.''  This discovering awaits the
discoveredness of only what is objectively present.

The scientific project of nature requires the thematization of what is
objectively present.  This \emph{requires that Da-sein transcend} the beings
thematized.  For thematization to modify the understanding of being presupposed
an understanding of something like being.  Handiness and objective presence
aren't differentiated, but there is still some unthematic relation to a context
of useful things.  ``\emph{A world must be disclosed to it}.''  Temporality is
the grounding of the being of Da-sein, and thus makes possible
being-in-the-world and the transcendence of Da-sein.  This supports the being
together with innerworldly beings that takes care theoretically or practically.

c. The Temporal Problem of the Transcendence of the World---
Taking care is grounded in in-order-to, what-for, for-that, and
for-the-sake-of-which, which together constitute world.  But how must world
\emph{be} in order for Da-sein to exist as being-in-the-world?  The existential
possibility of the world is possible because temporality has a horizon.  Each
ecstasy has a ``whereto'' of raptness, a horizonal schema.

\begin{itemize}
\item
Da-sein comes back to itself \emph{futurally} in the schema of
\emph{for-the-sake-of-itself}.
\item
The horizonal structure of \emph{having-been} is characterized by the schema of
that \emph{in the face of which} Da-sein has been thrown and to which Da-sein
has been delivered over.
\item
The horizonal schema of the \emph{present} is determined by the
\emph{in-order-to}.
\end{itemize}

On the basis of the horizonal unity of these schemata of the ecstasies we can
see the primordial connection between the in-order-to and the
for-the-sake-of-which.  Thus the being that is always its There has something
like a disclosed world on the basis of the horizonal constitution of the
ecstatic unity of temporality.

Neither objectively present nor at hand, the world temporalizes itself in
temporality.  ``It `is' `there' together with the outside-itself of the
ecstasies'', and is not ``there'' unless Da-sein exists and temporalizes
itself.

In being together with things heedfully and factically, \emph{the world is
already presupposed}.  Innerworldly beings can only be discovered in the There
of Da-sein's existence, and Da-sein's control is limited to \emph{what},
\emph{which} direction, \emph{to what extent}, and \emph{how} it discovers and
discloses.

The world is ``further outside'' than any object.  ``The relations of
significance that determine the structure of the world are thus not a network
of forms that is imposed upon some material by a worldless subject.  Rather,
factical Da-sein, ecstatically understanding itself and its world in the unity
of the There, comes back from these horizons to the beings encountered in
them.''

The ``problem of transcendence'' is not an escape from a subject to objects
constituting a world, but the question of how beings encountered in the world
become objectified as encountered beings.

Developing the structure of world relies upon ``an ontology of possible
innerworldly beings$\ldots$oriented toward a clarified idea of being in general''.
First we must set forth the temporality of Da-sein.

\section{The Temporality of the Spatiality Characteristic of Da-sein}
``$\ldots$Da-sein must be addressed coordinately as `temporal' `and also' as
spatial.''  Temporality ``embraces'' spatiality as an existential foundation.

Spatiality is possible for Da-sein only as care---factically entangled
existing.  Da-sein does not fill out space as though objectively present, but
rather Da-sein takes space in.  Da-sein makes room for space, then comes back
to a ``place'' it has taken over.  It has made room for a leeway.

This making room is constituted by directionality and de-distancing.  How is
this grounded in temporality?  Making room is what allows Da-sein to
directionally discover something like a \emph{region}. This region has already
been discovered in the discovery and handling of useful things.
``Being-in-the-world that takes care of things is directed, directing
itself.$\ldots$ The self-directive discovering of a region is grounded in an
ecstatically retentive awaiting of the possible hither and whither.''  Making
room is a directed awaiting of region, and is equiprimordially a de-distancing
of things at hand and objectively present.  This is ``$\ldots$ grounded in a
making-present that belongs to the unity of temporality in which dierctionality
is possible, too.

The here of Da-sein's factical situation signifies ``the leeway of the range of
the totality of useful things taken care of nearby''.  This leeway is the
opening made by directionality and de-distancing.

In falling prey, Da-sein brings near in a way that is founded in ``making
present''.  This bringing near forets the over there, creating the illusion
that a thing is ``initially'' objectively present.

The priority of ``spatial representations'' in language comes from the kind of
being of Da-sein, not from the space itself.  Temporality, on whose basis
Da-sein is capable of breaking into space at all, meets up with these spatial
relations asit gets lost in making present and uses them as guidelines for
articulating understanding.

\section{The Temporal Meaning of the Everydayness of Da-sein}
Every structure of the constitution of being of Da-sein that we analyzed so
that we could arrive at temporality must now be \emph{taken back} and
understood in tems of temporality.  We started our analysis with Da-sein's
inconspicuous, average modes of existing, in which Da-sein holds itself
initially and for the most part---everydayness.  ``Initially'' signifies the
priority of being-with-one-another in publicness, even if this is existentially
``overcome''.  ``For the most part'' means that Da-sein shows itself and exists
in everydayness ``as a rule'', but clearly not always.  Everydayness is a being
comfortable in habit, a \emph{stretching along} ``temporally'' in the
succession of days.  This habit, this ``like yesterday, so today and
tomorrow'', and the ``for the most part'' require that we understand the
``temporal'' stretching along of Da-sein.

Basically we now see that everydayness means temporality, so back we come to
having to understand being.

\section*{Temporality and Historicity}
\section{Existential and Ontological Exposition of the Problem of History}
More primordial than the project of Da-sein's authentic existence as a basis
for understanding Da-sein is to not limit the investigation to futurality.
Death is merely Da-sein's ``end'', and \emph{one} such end at that.  The other
``end'' of Da-sein is its ``beginning''.  Thus far we have examined Da-sein
leaving ``behind'' everything that has been.  The whole which ought to be the
subject of our analysis is the ``connection of life'' in which Da-sein
\emph{stretches along between} birth and death.

Da-sein doesn't fill up a stretch ``of life'' by accumulating discrete and
objectively present moments of reality; it stretches \emph{itself} along---its
own being is alread this stretching along.  The ``between'' is already \emph{in
the being} of Da-sein.

Factical Da-sein is not something that was born in a past no longer real.
Da-sein is born, is dying.  To clarify the ``connectedness of life'' will
require an approach with Da-sein's temporal constitution as its horizon.

The movement of the \emph{stretched out stretching itself along} is Da-sein's
\emph{occurrence}.  By understanding the \emph{structure of occurrence} we can
understand \emph{historicity} \emph{ontologically}.  Understood objectively,
history becomes the scientific object of historiography, and attitude athat is
derivative of the basic phenomenon of history, which concerns the
self-constancy of Da-sein that is a mode of its being ``grounded in a specific
temporalizing of temporality''.  We must investigate the rootedness of
historicity in temporality.

Rooted in care, historicity is either authentic or inauthentic.  The nearest
horizon of everydayness is Da-sein's inauthentic historicity.

Okay, so p. 345 is mostly nonsense, I think, but he claims that historicity and
within-time-ness are equiprimordial, thus justifying vulgar understanding in
his usual wa and preparing for an analysis thereof.

\section{The Vulgar Understanding of History and the Occurrence of Da-sein}
We must disambiguate the vulgar interpretation of ``history'' and
``historical''.  There are four meanigs to examine:

\begin{enumerate}
\item
Something that belongs to former events but is still objectively present
``now''.  Example: remains of a Greek temple.
\item
A ``connection'' of events ``past'', ``present'', and ``future''.
\emph{Derivation} of past, ``development''.  ``Past'' has no priority here.
\item
``Human history.''  Distinct from nature.  ``Spirit'' and ``culture'' of
humankind.
\item
That which has been handed down.  Inherited knowledge.
\end{enumerate}

These all posit human being as the ``subject'' of events.  Why is the past so
important here?  We must explore the temporal meaning of the ``past''.  What
makes an ``antiquity'' ``past'' when it is still objectively present in the
``present''?  What is ``past'' about them?  The \emph{world} in which they were
encountered as useful things at hand in heedful circumspection by Da-sein, a
\emph{world} which is no longer.  What does itmean that the world no-longer-is?
World \emph{is} only in the mode of \emph{existing} Da-sein.  That is,
\emph{factically as being-in-the-world}.''  Historical character of antiquities
is grounded in the ``past'' of Da-sein to whose world that past belongs.  This
means only ``past'' Da-sein can be historical, by which we mean Da-sein that
\emph{has-been-there}.  Why does \emph{having-been} \emph{predominately}
determine what is historical when it temporalizes itself equiprimordially with
present and future?

Da-sein is \emph{primarily} historical.  Beings unlike Da-sein encountered in
the world, including \emph{nature}, are \emph{secondarily} historical.  These
are world-historical, which is the source of the vulgar concept of ``world
history''.  What about historicity?

\section{The Essential Constitution of Historicity}
Da-sein always has its ``history'' because its being is constituted by
historicity.  This all rests on temporality, which we first explores through
the authentic existence that is anticipatory resoluteness---confronting death
as one's potentiality-of-being in order to take over the being that Da-sein is
in its thrownness.  Da-sein comes back to itself in resoluteness.  Resoluteness
\emph{takes over Da-sein's heritage} as thrown and discloses to Da-sein its
factical possibilities of authentic existing \emph{in terms of that heritage}.
Being free \emph{for} death---clearing its schedule---gives Da-sein its goal
and establishes in a possibility both inherited and chosen.

Da-sein is not ``subject'' to fate---it \emph{is} fate.  Da-sein, resolutely
handing itself down, is disclosed being-in-the-world for the ``coming'' of
``fortunate'' circumstances and the ``cruelty of chance''.

Fateful Da-sein exists as being-in-the-world in being-with others.  Its
occurrence is therefore an occurrence-with, which is determined by
\emph{destiny}.  This is the occurrence of a community.  Destiny is from
being-with-one-another in the same world and in resoluteness for definite
possibilities.  The complete, authentic occurrence of Da-sein is constituted by
Da-sein's destiny in and with its ``generation''.

Fatefulness is being historical in the ground of one's existence, and this can
only happen in a being constituted as care.

So... the others with whom Da-sein is in the world constitute a ground, a
common occurrence, a destiny.  This is the context for a being constituted as
care to have a ``history'', historicity, and for being fateful, to hand itself
down to itself.

A being must be equiprimordially \emph{futural} and \emph{having-been} in order
to hand down its inherited possibility t itself, ``take over its own thrownness
and be \emph{in the Moment} for `its time'.''

When resolute Da-sein hands itself down, and Da-sein goes back to the
possibilities of Da-sein that has been there, \emph{this explicit handing down
is Retrieve}.

History as a mode of being of Da-sein has its roots in the future.

Retrieve hands down fateful destiny along with heritage.  It is the handing
down of project, goal, of one's end.

All of this historicity is in corformity with the occurrence lying in
anticipatory resoluteness, so we'll call it Da-sein's \emph{authentic}
historicity.  This whole model still comes off as discrete, though, with
Da-sein having successive resolutions and experiences.  Where is the
``connection''?  Time to look at the \emph{origin} of the question of the
constitution of the connection of Da-sein.  Perhaps our inquiry thus far has
determined the question and blocked out our access to the ``connection'' of
authentic historicity.

\section{The Historicity of Da-sein and World History}
Da-sein initially and for the most part understands itself in terms of what it
encounters in the world and circumspectly takes care of.  This understanding is
a projection upon possibilities, so understanding things encountered and taken
care of is to concern oneself not just with useful things but with what ``is
going on'' with them.

``\emph{The occurrence of history is the occurrence of being-in-the-world}.''
This includes the useful things and objectively present things encountered by
being-in-the-world, for they have their fates and histories.  These beings are
\emph{world-historical}.  Factical Da-sein is entangles, and so in
understanding itself in terms of the things it takes care of it understands its
history as world history.  Everyday Da-sein is dispersed in the multiplicity of
its affairs, of what it takes care of.  To come to itself, it ``must first
\emph{pull itself together} from the \emph{dispersion} and
\emph{disconnectedness} of what has just `happened'\,''.  Now we can glean from
the horizon of inauthentic historicity just what the \emph{question} of
``connectedness'' is.

We inauthentically see that Da-sein pulls itself together into its connection.
How did it lose itself in the first place that it must be pulled together?
Resolute, authentic Da-sein stands against the inconstancy of dispersion as a
\emph{steadiness that has been stretched along}.  Resoluteness is existence's
\emph{loyalty} to its own self.  It is not an ``act'' that is performed
sometimes but not others.  Resoluteness provides the existentiell constancy
which has anticipated every possible Moment.  Resoluteness, as fate, frees
Da-sein to \emph{give up} a resolution.  So constancy is not the joining
together of Moments, but Moments arise from the \emph{already stretched along}
temporality of that retrieve which is futurally having-been.

It makes sense now to look for an ontological genesis of historiography as a
science in terms of Da-sein's historicity.

\section{The Existential Origin of Historiography from the Historicity of
Da-sein}
Historiographical disclosure of history is rooted in Da-sein's historicity,
having the same ontological structure.  Historiographical thematization of
history can only occur following the disclosure of the ``past'' in general.
This is only possible through Da-sein, so ``what historiographical
thematization presents as the possible object of its investigation must have
the kind of being of Da-sein \emph{that has been there}''.

World history \emph{is} together with Da-sein as being-in-the-world.  Once
Da-sein is no longer there, the world is also something that has-been-there.
World-historical objectively present things can \emph{become}
\emph{historiographical} material by being understood by Da-sein that
has-been-there.  This doesn't return to the ``past''; it presupposed
\emph{historical being toward} Da-sein that has-been-there, the historicity of
the historian's existence.  This existence is what existentially grounds
historiography as a science.  From here we can determine the \emph{object} of
historiography, which must be linked to authentic history and its disclosure of
what-has-been-there.  This is retrieve.  One cannot have authentic
historiographical understanding, however, if the possibility to be retrieved is
distorted into notions of ``individual'' events and universal ``laws''.

Arising from the historicity of Da-sein, historiographical disclosure does not
work backwards from a ``present'' to a ``past'', but temporalizes itself
\emph{out of the future}, ``selecting'' its objects along with Da-sein's
existentiell \emph{choice}, or rather grounded in it.

Remember that historiography's central theme is not simply existence that
has-been-there but its \emph{possibility}.  This existence always factically
exists world-historically, so historiography is oriented toward ``facts''.

Suddenly ``we'' are biting off Nietzsche!  Heidegger's hot it down that
historiography isn't necessary for historicity, but Nietzsche asks whether it's
beneficial or detrimental to have historiography and so describes three kinds,
which we shall Marty up:

\begin{description}
\item[Monumental]: Historiography arising from historicity that resolutely comes back
to itsef, opening itself to the possibility of retrieve for the ``monumental''
possibilities of human existence.
\item[Antiquarian]: When historicity steps beyond retrieve and grasps the possibility
to reverently preserve what has-been-there which made manifest the possibility
to be retrieved.
\item[Critical]: When authentic, monumental-antiquarian historiography ceases to make
present the entangled publicness o today and exists as a critique of the
``present''.
\end{description}

So this ``\emph{threefold character of historiography}'' is prefigured in
Da-sein's historicity.  Authentic historicity makes possible their unity, but
this all comes back to ``\emph{temporality} as the existential meaning of being
of care.''

Time to see how this all works.  OK, let's do it...

\section{The Connection of the Foregoing Exposition of the Problem of
Historicity with the Investigations of Dilthey and the Ideas of Count Yorck}
Dilthey and Count Yorck!  We are talkin' about history, here.  Dude.  Yorck is
pretty sweet, all on about the ``generic difference between the ontic and the
historical.''  So what we gotta do now is find a \emph{more primordial unity}
of the ``ontic'' and the ``historiographical''.

So, what we gotta do is see to these points:

\begin{quote}
\begin{enumerate}
\item
The question of historicity is an \emph{ontological} question about the
constitution of being of historical beings.
\item
The question of the ontic is the \emph{ontological} question of the
constitution of being of beings unlike Da-sein, of what is objectively present
in the broadest sense.
\item
The ontic is only \emph{one} area of beings.
\end{enumerate}
\end{quote}

The ``ontic'' and the ``historigraphical'' are encompassed in the idea of
being.  Wait... does this mean we need to clarify fundamental ontology first?

NO

FUCKING

WAY!

Dude.

\section*{Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of
Time}
\section{The Incompleteness of the Foregoing Temporal Analysis of Da-sein}
Prior to any thematic inuvestigation, such as the sciences of history and
nature, is Da-sein ``reckoning with time''.  This precedes instruments like
clocks, makes them possible.  Before proceeding, we must clarify \emph{how}
Da-sein reckons with time---what does it mean that beings are ``in time''?

Da-sein, \emph{as} temporality, temporalizes itself in a mode of behavior
related to time in \emph{such} a way that it ``takes accound of it.''  The
earlier interpretation is clearly \emph{primordial time}, and from it we can
find how Da-sein levels it down to come to the vulgar conception of time.

Before asking whether time has ``being'' and how it can be so designated, we
must investigate the role of temporality in Da-sein's understanding of being.
Good news if you like Hegel!

\section{The Temporality of Da-sein and Taking Care of Time}
Circumspect taking care is ``calculating, plamning, preparing ahead, and
preventing''.  It says ``then'' $\ldots$ that will happen, ``\emph{before}''
$\ldots$ that will get settled, ``\emph{now}'' $\ldots$ that will be made up for,
that ``\emph{on that former occasion}'' failed or eluded us.

Taking care expresses itself in$\ldots$

\begin{description}
\item[``then'']---awaiting
\item[``on that former occasion'']---retaining
\item[``now'']---making present
\end{description}

The ``then'' is ``spoken in a making present that awaitingly retains or
forgets''; the ``now not yet'' is contained within.

Likewise, the ``on that former occasion'' contains the ``now no longer'',
wherein retaining expresses itself as a making present that awaits.  These are
understoof with regard to a ``now'', and making present carries a lot of
weight.

Horizons of retaining:

\begin{description}
\item[``on that former occasion'']---``\emph{earlier}''
\item[``then'']---``\emph{later on}''
\item[``now'']---``\emph{today}''
\end{description}

But what are these \emph{as such}?

\begin{description}
\item[``then'']---``then, when $\ldots$''
\item[``on that former occasion'']---``on that former occasion when $\ldots$''
\item[``now'']---``now that $\ldots$''
\end{description}

This is called \emph{datability}.  Why does Da-sein express these concepts?
Because in so doing Da-sein also expresses \emph{itself}, in that it is
expressing circumspect and understanding \emph{being-together-with} things at
hand.  This is necessarily grounded in a \emph{making-present}.  This
interpretedness that takes care is how temporality is initially and for the
most part made known.

``Then'' also contains the ``and now not yet''---the awaiting that makes
present understands the ``until then.''  This is an \emph{in-between},
expressed datably in the ``meanwhile''.

This is all a ``during'' that makes present and awaits.  The during is the time
revealed in the \emph{self}-interpretation of temporality, understood as a
``span''.  The making present that awaits and retains is thus disclosed to
\emph{itself} as being ecstatically \emph{stretched along} in historical
temporality.

Example: ``now'' in the intermission, at dinner; ``then'' at breakfast.  The
taking care that awaits, retains, and makes present ``allows itself'' time,
giving itself time in taking care without determining it prior to any specific
reckoning.

Time here dates itself in terms of what one does ``all day long''.  The mor
eDa-sein is absorbed in awaiting what is taken care of, the less it awaits
itself and Da-sein begins to forget itself.  In so doing, the time Da-sein
``allows'' itself is \emph{covered over}.

``We often cannot bring a `day' together again when we come back to the time
that we have `used'.''

Because of this covering over, the time Da-sein allows itself has ``gaps'' in
it.  This doesn't mean it goes to pieces, but rather means that this time with
gaps is a mode of temporality that is disclosed and ecstatically
\emph{stretched along}.

We can only appropriately phenomenally explicate this mode in which ``allowed''
time ``elapses'' if we ``avoid the theoretical `representation' of a continuous
stream of nows'' and instead consider the modes in which Da-sein allows itself
time in terms of ``\emph{how it `has' its time in a manner corresponding to its
actual existence}.''

Irresolute, inauthentic existence temporalizes as making present that does not
await but forgets, and in losing \emph{itself} in what is taken car eof
irresolute Da-sein also loses \emph{its time}.  Hence, ``I have no time.''

Resolute Da-sein temporally exists as the \emph{Moment}, fatefully whole and
stretched along in the authentic, historical \emph{constancy} of the self.  The
There is disclosed only as situation, and resolute Da-sein ``constantly'' has
time \emph{for} what the situation requires.

Several people saying ``\emph{now}'' together are dating this ``now''
differently.  Thus Da-sein is \emph{making} the time it interprets and
expresses \emph{public} in that it is \emph{being-with} as being-in-the-world.

Everyday taking care, understanding itself in terms of the ``world'' taken care
of, knows its ``time'' \emph{not as its own}, instead heedfully exploiting the
time ``there is'', with which the \emph{they} reckons.

\section{Time Taken Care of and Within-Timeness}
Is public time ``merely subjective''?  ``Objectively real''?  Neither?  First
we must precisely determine the phenomenal character of public time.

In taking care, one orients oneself \emph{toward time}, making it public,
available for everyone.  This ``public time'' is \emph{the} time ``in which''
innerworldly things at hand and objectively present are encountered, beings
unlike Da-sein.  We'll now call such beings \emph{within-time}, which will help
us understand ``public time''.

Circumspect being-in-the-world requires the \emph{possibility of sight}, a need
which led to the primacy of day and night in our reckoning with time.  ``The
occurrence of Da-sein is a \emph{daily one} by reason of interpreting time by
dating it---a way that is prefigured in its thrownness into the There.
Temporality is simultaneously the condition for the discoverability of the
clock and of the possibility of the clock's factical necessity.

In taking care, time is always already understood as time for $\ldots$.  The
``now that so and so'' is as \emph{such} either \emph{appropriate} or
\emph{inappropriate}.  Interpreted time has the character of ``time for
$\ldots$'' or ``not the time for $\ldots$''.  Time made public, as time for $\ldots$,
has the nature of world, so we'll call it \emph{world time}.  Not because it's
\emph{innerworldly} (it can't be), but because it belongs \emph{to the world}.

Time taken care of ``is datable, spanned, and public and, as having this
structure, it belongs to the world itself.''

``Time'' is neither objectively present in the ``subject'' nor in the
``object'', neither ``inside'' nor ``outside''.

Temporality temporalizes \emph{world} time that constitutes a within-timeness
of things at hand and objectively present.  These beings are unlike Da-sein,
and so they can not be called temporal since they are atemporal ``whether they
occur, arise, and pass away realistically, or subsist `ideally'.''

Everyday taking care that gives itself time finds ``time'' in innerworldly
beings.  Thus, our look at the genesis of vulgar time starts from
within-timeness.

\section{Within-Timeness and the Genesis of the Vulgar Concept of Time}
What's up with clocks?  By \emph{following} the clock hands in a way that makes
present, one \emph{counts} them.  In making present the moving hands, one says
``now here, now here, and so on'', counting nows.  This world-time we'll call
\emph{now-time}.

Lost in useful things taken care of, Da-sein finds the time belonging to these
things.  The more this is done, the more is said: now, then, on that former
occasion, showing time vulgarly as a succession of objectively present nows
``that pass away and arrive at the same time.''

These nows \emph{lack} both datability and significance, \emph{levelled down}
so that they run along after one another to constitute a succession.  More and
mor ethe nows are ``seen'' as themselves objectively present, as though
``beings are encountered \emph{and also} the now.''

This is most penetratingly revealed in the vulgar interpretation's main
thesis---the ``infinitude'' of time.  This is possible only on the basis of
``an orientation \emph{toward an unattached in-itself of a course of nows
objectively present}.''

Heedful flight \emph{from} death looks away \emph{from} the end of
being-in-the-world.  Death is always my own, and so the they is \emph{unable}
to die, it ``always has more time''.  Public time, levelled down, belongs to
everyone, and thus no one.  Ecstatic, horizonal temporality temporalizes itself
primarily from the future, but the vulgar understanding starts with the
\emph{now}, specifically the pure now we cal the ``present''.  There is some
provenance and factical necessity of vulgar time, and something about Hegel and
spirit, so here we go.

\section{The Contrast of te Existential and Ontological Connection of
Temporality, Da-sein, and World Time with Hegel's Interpretation of the
Relation between Time and Spirit}
a: Hegel's Concept of Time---
For Hegel, time is the ``\emph{intuited}'' becoming, an unthought transition
between nows wherein being ``goes over'' to nonbeing and vice versa.  This is
\emph{clearly} vulgar, and we'll think of it as the \emph{negation of
negation}.

b: Hegel's Interpretation of the Connection between Time and Spirit---
For Hegel, spirit conceives \emph{itself}, it is \emph{grasping} the
\emph{non}-I.  The essence of spirit is the negation of a negation.

Hegel sought ``concretion'' of the spirit, and we seek the ``concretion'' of
factically thrown existence.  Hegel sought to describe how ``spirit'' falls
intdo time through the above connection and primordial kinship of the two, and
we seek to describe how, falling prey, factical existence falls \emph{out of}
primordial, authentic temporality.

\section{The Existential and Temporal Analytic of Da-sein and the Question of
Fundamental Ontology as to the Meaning of Being in General}
The being of Da-sein, and the distinction between this and beings unlike
Da-sein, is merely the \emph{point of departure} for the ontological
problematic.  We must understand the nature of the ``reification'' that
constantly threatens investigation of the being of Da-sein.

We require a secure horizon for questions and answers.  ``The \emph{strife} in
relation to the interpretation of being cannot be settled \emph{because it has
not yet even been started}.''

Da-sein, thanks to our clarification of its being, can now be related to
\emph{beings}, those encountered in the world and that of itself in existing.

How is this understanding possible?

``The existential and ontological constitution of the totality of Da-sein is
grounded in temporality.  Accordingly, a primordial mode of temporalizing of
ecstatic temporality itself must make the ecstatic project of being in general
possible.  How is this mode of temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted?
Is there a way leading from primordial \emph{time} to the meaning of
\emph{being}?  Does \emph{time} itself reveal itself as the horizon of
\emph{being}?

OK, let's do it...

\end{document}